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Is Canada the New Shangri-La of Global
Securities Class Actions?
Tanya J. Monestier*
Abstract: There has been significant academic buzz about Silver v. Imax, an
Ontario case certifying a global class of shareholders alleging statutory and
common law misrepresentation in connection with a secondary market
distribution of shares. Although global class actions on a more limited scale
have been certified in Canada prior to Imax, it can now be said that global
classes have “officially” arrived in Canada. Many predict that the Imax
decision means that Ontario will become the new center for the resolution of
global securities disputes. This is particularly so after the United States largely
relinquished this role in Morrison v. National Australia Bank.
Whether Imax proves to be a meaningful precedent or simply an aberration will
largely depend on whether the court dealt appropriately with the conflict of laws
issues at the heart of the case. No author has yet addressed the conflict of laws
complications posed by the certification of global class actions in Canada; this
Article seeks to fill that void. In particular, I use the Imax case as a lens
through which to canvass the conflict of laws issues raised by the certification of
global classes. I look at the difficult questions of jurisdiction simpliciter,
recognition of judgments, choice of law, parallel proceedings, and
notice/procedural rights that need to be addressed now that global classes have
come to Canada.
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To use Justice Scalia’s colorful language in Morrison, courts outside
the United States may be setting themselves up to be the ‘Shangri-La[s]’ of
global class action securities litigation.1
I. INTRODUCTION
While Canadian courts are still grappling with the constitutional and
pragmatic intricacies of inter-provincial class actions, a new paradigm
appears to be on the horizon—that of the “global” class action. A global
class action is one in which some portion of the claimants hail from
jurisdictions outside Canada.2 In December 2009, the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice in Silver v. Imax Corp.3 certified a global class of
shareholders that alleged statutory and common law misrepresentation
claims in connection with a secondary market distribution of the
defendant’s shares. In early 2011, the Superior Court denied leave to
appeal its earlier decision certifying the class to the Divisional Court.4
Imax is the first court ruling to address the statutory provisions for
secondary market liability under Ontario’s Securities Act.5 It has been
heralded as an “epic”6 decision and one that “may make Ontario a new
haven for secondary market class actions.”7 Interestingly, just as Ontario

1

Linda J. Silberman, Morrison v. National Australia Bank: Implications for Global
Securities Class Actions 15 (N.Y.U. Sch. of L. Pub. Law. & Legal Theory Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 11-41, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1864786 (alteration in original). Professor Silberman was referring to
Justice’s Scalia’s observation in Morrison that “some fear that [the United States] has
become the Shangri-La of class-action litigation for lawyers representing those allegedly
cheated in foreign securities markets.” Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct.
2869, 2886 (2010).
2
They are sometimes referred to as “transnational,” “international,” “trans-border,”
“worldwide,” “multinational” or “multi-jurisdictional” class actions to denote the fact that
they encompass claimants from outside the forum. In Canada, however, they are customarily
referred to as “global” class actions, and this terminology will be used throughout this
Article. In addition, the expressions “claimant,” “class member” or “plaintiff” will be used
interchangeably.
3
The court issued two separate decisions: (2009) 66 B.L.R. 4th 222 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.
J.) (OSA Leave Decision); (2009) 86 C.P.C. 6th 273 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (Certification
Decision). Unless otherwise indicated, references are to the Certification Decision.
4
2011 ONSC 103 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (Leave to Appeal Decision). Collectively, I
refer to the three decisions as Imax.
5
Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 (Can.).
6
Mark Gelowitz, Court Certifies Class Action Against Imax: Liability May be Coming
Soon to a Theatre Near You, LAWYERS WEEKLY (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.lawyersweekly.
ca/index.php?section=article&articleid=1103.
7
Id. Notably, 92% of all issuers in Canadian capital markets are based in Ontario,
Alberta, British Columbia, and Québec. A.C. Pritchard & Janis Sarra, Securities Class
Actions Move North: A Doctrinal and Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Actions in
Canada, 47 ALTA L. REV. 881, 884 (2010). Moreover, certification rates in Ontario are
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courts are opening their doors to global securities class actions,8 American
courts seem to be closing theirs.9 In a landmark ruling in June 2010, the
U.S. Supreme Court in Morrison v. National Australia Bank10 held that
investors who purchase securities on a foreign exchange do not have a
claim under U.S. federal securities law. The precedent in Morrison means
that it will be difficult—if not impossible—for plaintiffs to pursue global
securities class actions in U.S. federal courts under circumstances in which
the class members did not purchase or sell their shares on a U.S. exchange.
The confluence of the jurisprudential developments in Canada and in
the U.S. “has some analysts wondering whether [Ontario] will become a
hub for aggrieved foreign investors.”11 In May 2011, Canada’s Globe and

much higher than those of other provinces. See Adrian Land & Mel Hogg, Certification
Rates in Ontario Versus The Rest of Canada: Why the Disparity? 6 CAN. CLASS ACTION
REV. 433, 433 (2010) (“In Ontario, there has been a consistent trend towards a ‘certify now,
ask questions later’ approach in class action jurisprudence. Indeed, certification motions are
successful much more often in Ontario than in the rest of Canada.”).
8
Toronto-based National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA) reports that there
were fifteen securities class actions filed in 2011, the most ever in a calendar year. The
additional filings brought the total number of active securities cases in Canada to forty-five
cases, more than twice the number of cases pending at the end of 2007. These cases
represent a total of approximately CDN $24.5 billion in outstanding claims. See Bradley
Heys and Mark Berenblut, Trends In Canadian Securities Class Actions: 2011 Update,
NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.nera. com/67_7596.htm.
9
Andrew Jeffries, Class Actions: A Global Update, ALLEN & OVERY (Jan. 18, 2011),
http://www.allenovery.com/AOWEB/Knowledge/Editorial.aspx?contentTypeID=1&itemID
=59663&prefLangID=410 (“At the same time as Morrison, the courts over the border in
Canada were developing their own F-Cubed regime.”).
10
130 S. Ct. at 2873 (2010).
11
Angelina Chapin, Investor Justice to the Max, CANADIAN BUS. (Apr. 11, 2011),
http://www.canadianbusiness.com/article/20535—investor-justice-to-the-max; see also
Working Group on U.S.-Canada Cross-Border Class Action Protocols, Report to the House
of Delegates, 2011 A.B.A. SEC. OF LITIG. 2, available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/house_of_delegates/resolutions/2011_hod_annual_meeting_
101c.doc (“The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent strong reiteration in Morrison v. National
Australia Bank of the ‘presumption against extraterritoriality’ . . . will force many class
actions out of the U.S. courts (in whole or in part). Given the U.S. courts’ retrenchment and
the resulting difficulty of both American and non-American plaintiffs and class members to
now seek redress in U.S. courts, those foreign jurisdictions that do have class or ‘mass’
actions can expect increasing caseloads . . . .”); Irwin H. Warren & Matthew E.K. Howatt,
Transnational Securities Litigation in the U.S. Courts After Morrison v. National Australia
Bank: An “F-Cubed” Regression Analysis, 2010 CANADIAN INST. 33 [hereinafter Warren &
Howatt], available at http://www.weil.com/files/Publication/362ff7fb-5049-42e0-a731a5d457ae7b62/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e83b53f9-93f0-4334-a164ada9832feb9b/Canadian%20Institute%20Morrison%20Paper.pdf (“Morrison may help
accelerate the pace and increase the scope of Canada as a transnational securities litigation
center (or perhaps more aptly, centre).”); Geneviève Saumier, Securities Class Actions and
Extra-territoriality: The View From Canada, CONFLICT OF LAWS.NET (June 30, 2010),
http://conflictoflaws.net/2010/securities-class-actions-and-extra-territoriality-a-view-from-
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Mail newspaper reported that prominent American plaintiffs’ attorney
Michael Spencer was moving his securities litigation practice north of the
border.12 The article explains why Spencer chose to set up shop in Canada:
Mr. Spencer makes no bones about why, at the pinnacle of his career,
he is prepared to swap the perks of a privileged life in Manhattan for
Toronto. It’s because of Ontario’s Bill 198, enacted in 2005, which
allows shareholders who buy stock on the open market to sue if they
feel a company misrepresents its financial situation.
Ordinarily, an amendment to provincial securities law would not
attract the attention of someone in Mr. Spencer’s ambit, but these are
not ordinary times for U.S. class-action lawyers. . . . [Describing
U.S. developments]
....
Set that against an Ontario decision last year to take jurisdiction over
a global class of shareholders in Silver v. Imax Corp., and Toronto’s
appeal becomes obvious.
“Simply put, Canada presents a great opportunity,” Mr. Spencer says
from his Milberg office in New York.13

Whether Canada presents “a great opportunity” depends in part on
whether the Imax court was correct to certify a global class in the first
place. Global class action litigation raises myriad conflict of laws
complications, many of which were not adequately addressed in the Imax
canada/ (“[T]he ruling in Morrison might increase traffic towards Canadian courts given
their potentially greater openness to multijurisdictional securities class actions.”); Luke
Green, Multi-National Securities Class Actions Go Global, ISS GOVERNANCE (Jan. 11, 2011
6:26 PM), http://blog.issgovernance.com/slw/2011/01/multi-national-securities-class-actiongo-international.html (noting that “[i]n the future, Canada and the Netherlands could be
poised to replace the U.S. as the most frequent forums for large multi-national securities
class actions.”).
12
Sandra Rubin, Top U.S. Class-Action Lawyer Comes to Canada, GLOBE AND MAIL
(May 10, 2011), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/thelaw-page/top-us-class-action-lawyer-coming-to-canada/article2017397/. Spencer was most
recently lead counsel in the Vivendi global class action in the Southern District of New York
that left the defendant corporation facing a US $9.3-billion damage award for misleading
investors. Id. The damages award was reduced in February, 2011 when a judge
significantly narrowed the scope of the class in light of the Morrison decision. Id.
13
Id. See also Ashby Jones, Lawyers Looking to Canada for Shareholder Litigation,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020
3833004577247211369677658.html (“Unfavorable court rulings and legislation have helped
damp filings of securities class-action lawsuits in the U.S., but these suits are starting to gain
traction in Canada, prompting some U.S. lawyers to look for opportunities up north.”).
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decision—or any other Canadian decision. If Canadian courts are to
become the new “Shangri-La” of global securities class action litigation as
some are predicting, increased attention needs to be paid to the conflict of
laws considerations at the heart of global class actions.14
This Article endeavors to use the Imax case as a lens through which to
canvass the conflict of laws issues raised by the certification of global
classes. In particular, I look at the thorny issues of jurisdiction simpliciter,
recognition of judgments, choice of law, parallel proceedings, and
notice/procedural rights in order to tease out the salient issues that Canadian
courts face in the years ahead if they continue to entertain the notion of
global class actions. Where appropriate, I look at the parallel U.S.
jurisprudence in order to present a broader picture of the issues at play. The
goal of the paper is not to solve the problems attendant to the certification
of global classes in Canada, but rather to provide a critical and fulsome
exposition of the issues that are emerging as class litigation goes global.
In Part II, I provide a brief description and overview of Imax. In Part
III, I situate global class actions in Canada in the broader transnational
litigation landscape, discussing both the context in which global classes
emerged in Canada and why this seemingly discrete development in
Canadian civil procedure is significant to the United States. In Part IV, I
discuss the private international law issues raised by the certification of
global classes in Canada. Specifically, I examine the following: jurisdiction
simpliciter, recognition of class judgments, choice of law, parallel
proceedings and notice/procedural rights. In Part V, I offer some
concluding thoughts about the future of global classes in Canada.
14

Those who view the Imax decision as signaling that Ontario (or any other Canadian
province) will become the new hub of global securities litigation should consider that, aside
from the conflict of laws issues, there may be other obstacles to Canada becoming the
Shangri-La of global securities class actions. At least two such obstacles come to mind.
First, Canada may not be a big enough player in the global securities arena to become the
new securities class actions hub. In order to certify a class action in Ontario, the Ontario
court must be able to assert jurisdiction over the defendant (and the absent plaintiff class).
This will usually require that the defendant be domiciled in Ontario or that the defendant
sold securities in Ontario. There may be a limited pool of defendants who fit those criteria.
Second, there are cost consequences associated with pursuing securities litigation in Canada
that may prevent Canada from becoming the new haven for global securities class actions.
See, e.g., Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc., 2007 SCC 44, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 331 (Can.) (upholding a
costs award in excess of CDN $500,000 against a representative plaintiff and noting that
“[t]hose who inflict [litigation] on others in the hope of significant personal gain and fail can
generally expect adverse cost consequences.”). Id. at para. 63. For a recent description of
costs in class litigation, see Celeste Poltak, Certification: Have the Costs Become Prohibitive
In
Ontario?,
LAWYER’S
WEEKLY
(Jan.
28,
2011),
http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section= article&articleid=1335.
Thus, the
question of whether Canada will become the new Shangri-La of global securities class
actions is not answered entirely by reference to the conflict of laws considerations associated
with the certification of global classes.
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II. THE SILVER V. IMAX DECISION
Imax is the quintessential securities fraud case: a class action initiated
by aggrieved shareholders who allegedly suffered financial losses after the
defendant corporation overstated its revenues. The defendant, Imax, is a
public company based in Ontario that is in the business of manufacturing,
selling and leasing large screen theater systems and their components. It
sells its shares on both the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and the
NASDAQ. In March 2006, Imax released five public statements about its
2005 financial results; these communications contained allegedly false
statements that overstated the company’s revenues for the previous
financial year.15 Imax’s reporting of inflated revenue apparently stemmed
from a desire to reach or exceed revenue projections and to present the
company as an attractive target for a merger or take-over.16 Following the
public disclosure of its 2005 financial results, Imax’s stock price rose
significantly.17 On August 9, 2006, Imax made a public announcement that:
a) it had not found a buyer or a merger partner; and b) it was responding to
an informal inquiry from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) regarding its 2005 revenue recognition. Subsequent to this
announcement, the price of Imax’s shares fell sharply.18 In the fall of 2006,
Imax acknowledged that its 2005 financial statements had not complied
with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and the company
issued restated financial results for 2005.19
Based on these facts, plaintiffs sued Imax and certain of its officers
and directors for securities fraud. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class
15

According to the Statement of Facts in the Leave to Appeal Decision:
Revenues were overstated by taking into [account] 2005 revenue payments that had
not yet been made to IMAX under contracts IMAX had not yet performed
fully. This revenue recognition was justified by IMAX on the basis of accounting
principles it purported to apply to contingent receivables[.] There were two
problems with this revenue recognition by IMAX: (a) this was a changed approach
to recognizing contingent receivables, and this change, itself, was not disclosed in
the financial statements. Thus, a reader would not understand that the 2005
financial statements were presented on a different basis than the financial
statements for prior years. And thus, year-to-year comparisons could not be made
with confidence: to do so would have been, to some extent, comparing “apples to
oranges”; and (b) this approach to revenue recognition was not in accordance with
GAAP [Generally Accepted Accounting Principles].

Silver v. Imax Corp., 2011 ONSC 103, para. 15 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (Leave to Appeal
Decision).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
The next day, Imax’s shares fell 40%. See Silver v. Imax Corp., (2009) 86 C.P.C. 6th
273, para. 2 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (Certification Decision).
19
Id. at para. 3.
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action consisting of “persons who acquired securities of Imax on the TSX
and on NASDAQ on or after February 17, 2006 and held some or all of
those securities at the close of trading on August 9, 2006.”20 The plaintiffs
pursued both common law and statutory claims for misrepresentation on the
secondary market. Imax’s significance stems in part from being the first
case in which plaintiffs raised a statutory claim for misrepresentation
pursuant to Part XXIII.1 of the Ontario Securities Act (the “OSA”).21 A
statutory claim for damages under section 138.3 of Part XXIII.1 of the OSA
allows a shareholder to sue a reporting issuer as well as its directors and
officers in circumstances where there has been a misrepresentation in the
issuer’s secondary market disclosure. Under the statutory cause of action,
plaintiffs do not need to establish reliance; liability follows from proof of
the misrepresentation itself, subject to certain defenses.22 However,
statutory claims under the OSA are subject to certain limitations—most
significantly, a requirement for leave of the court before such an action can
be maintained (section 138.8)23 and a cap on recoverable damages (section
138.7).24
In late 2009, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice released two
companion decisions in which it granted leave to pursue the statutory cause
20

Id. at para. 6.
Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 (Can.). Part XXIII.1 of the
OSA came into force on December 31, 2005. On the new framework for misrepresentation
in the secondary market, and in particular, for a comparison with U.S. law, see Pritchard &
Sarra, supra note 7; see also Mary Condon, Rethinking Enforcement and Litigation in
Ontario’s Securities Regulation, 32 QUEEN’S L. J. 1 (2006); Andrea Laing & Brian Donnelly,
Silver v. Imax and Ainslie v. CV Technologies: What has Been Left Out of the Leave
Requirement, 5 CAN. CLASS ACTION REV. 180 (2009); LARRY P. LOWENSTEIN & MARY
PATERSON, CORPORATIONS, CLAIMANTS AND CROSS-BORDER ATTITUDES: THE DIFFERENT
APPROACHES IN ONTARIO AND THE UNITED STATES TO CIVIL LIABILITY FOR
MISREPRESENTATIONS IN THE SECONDARY SECURITIES MARKETS (2006), available at
http://www.ila2006.org/lowenstein.pdf.
22
Silver v. Imax Corp., (2009) 66 B.L.R. 4th 222, para. 13 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (OSA
Leave Decision).
23
Section 138.8 provides:
21

No action may be commenced under Section 138.3 without leave of the court
granted upon motion with notice to each defendant. The court shall grant leave
only where it is satisfied that: a) the action is being brought in good faith; and b)
there is a reasonable possibility that the action will be resolved at trial in favour of
the plaintiff.
Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, § 138.8 (Can.).
24
OSA Leave Decision, 66 B.L.R. (4th) 222, at para. 271 (“Section 138.7 provides for a
cap on damages. In the case of the responsible issuer, the cap is the greater of five per cent
of its market capitalization and [CDN] $1 million. For a director or officer of a responsible
issuer, the cap is the greater of [CDN] $25,000 and 50% of the aggregate of the director’s or
officer’s compensation from the responsible issuer and its affiliates.”).
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of action under the OSA and certified the Imax action as a global class
proceeding. With respect to the leave requirement under section 138.8 of
the OSA, Justice van Rensburg concluded that the OSA sets “a relatively
low threshold for a plaintiff seeking leave to proceed with an action.”25
After canvassing over 30 volumes of evidence, examining the genesis of the
statutory cause of action and engaging in extensive statutory interpretation,
Justice van Rensburg determined that the plaintiffs had established that the
action was brought in good faith and that there was a reasonable possibility
of success at trial.26 In the certification decision, Justice van Rensburg
certified both the statutory and the common law causes of action pursuant
to section 5(1) of Ontario’s Class Proceedings Act.27 The court focused its
analysis primarily on whether the common law claims for misrepresentation
should be certified.28 Justice van Rensburg determined that plaintiffs could
maintain their suit despite the fact that they had not pleaded individual
25

Id. at para. 25.
Id. Note that the claims against certain of Imax’s officers and directors were dismissed.
S.O. 1992, c. 6 (Can.). Section 5 provides:

26
27

5(1) The court shall certify a class proceeding on a motion under section 2, 3
or 4 if,
(a) the pleadings or the notice of application discloses a cause of action;
(b) there is an identifiable class of two or more persons that would be
represented by the representative plaintiff or defendant;
(c) the claims or defences of the class members raise common issues;
(d) a class proceeding would be the preferable procedure for the resolution of
the common issues; and
(e) there is a representative plaintiff or defendant who,
(i) would fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class,
(ii) has produced a plan for the proceeding that sets out a workable method
of advancing the proceeding on behalf of the class and of notifying class
members of the proceeding, and
(iii) does not have, on the common issues for the class, an interest in
conflict with the interests of other class members.
Id. at § 5.
28
Apparently, defendants (arguably erroneously) conceded that the statutory cause of
action under the OSA was appropriate for class certification. Silver v. Imax Corp., (2009)
86 C.P.C. 6th 273, para. 13 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (Certification Decision) (“[t]he
acknowledgement that the statutory claims are suitable for certification is an important
concession in this case.”). Plaintiffs likely asserted common law misrepresentation claims in
order to avoid the damages cap under section 138.7 of the OSA.
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reliance on the defendant’s misstatements, indicating that “[i]t should be
open to the plaintiffs to attempt to establish in the common issues trial that,
as a factual matter, reliance has been established for all members of the
class through proof of the common action of purchasing shares.”29 The
defendants subsequently sought leave to appeal Justice van Rensburg’s
certification and statutory leave decisions to the Divisional Court. In a
judgment rendered in early 2011, Justice Corbett dismissed the defendant’s
motion and ruled that the Imax case could, in fact, proceed as a global class
action.
As one commentator notes, “[m]ost of the attention in the press has
been focused on the decision granting leave, as the IMAX case is the first
court ruling to address the statutory provisions for secondary market
liability.”30 And to be sure, Imax is a critical decision establishing the
initial parameters of the new statutory cause of action. In particular, the
decision is seen as very favorable to the plaintiffs’ bar, as it sets a low
threshold for the pursuit of the OSA statutory cause of action. Additionally,
in endorsing the principle of “inferred reliance,”31 Imax confirms that
common law fraud claims remain a viable alternative to the statutory cause
of action under the OSA.
However, one aspect of the decision appears to have been somewhat
overlooked in much of the commentary: that the court in Imax certified a
global class of shareholders who were allegedly deceived by the
defendant’s misrepresentations. Imax is truly the first case of its kind in
this respect—never before has a global class of claimants on such a large
scale been certified in a Canadian court. Although the court in Imax did
attempt to wade through the conflict of laws intricacies associated with the
certification of a global class, it left the resolution of the hard questions
until later, indicating that “[t]he appropriate approach in this litigation is to
‘wait and see’ how the conflict of laws issues may develop . . . .”32

29

Id. at para. 190. Justice Corbett, in the Leave to Appeal Decision, was clear to point
out that this is not equivalent to the U.S. doctrine of “fraud on the market,” whereby reliance
is presumed as a matter of law in an efficient market. In describing the difference he stated,
“[t]here is a distinction between deemed reliance by operation of law and a factual finding
that the ‘efficient market’ theory applies to the specific statements allegedly made by this
public issuer to the market in this case.” Silver v. Imax Corp., 2011 ONSC 103, para. 53
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (Leave to Appeal Decision). One commentator, however, argues that
“[c]ertifying common law misrepresentation claims on the basis of a rebuttable inference of
group reliance on an efficient market is not different in principle from certifying a class
action based on fraud on the market, a theory that has been expressly rejected by the courts
in Ontario.” Andrew Gray, The IMAX Decisions: Expanding the Scope of Securities Class
Actions, CLASS ACTION DEFENCE Q., Mar. 2010, at 29.
30
Joseph C. D’Angelo, Class Actions: Implications of Silver v. Imax, MCMILLAN (Apr.
2010), http://www.mcmillan.ca/93478.
31
Silver v. Imax Corp., 2011 ONSC 103, para. 58 & n.25 (Leave to Appeal Decision).
32
Silver v. Imax Corp. (2009), 86 C.P.C. 6th 273, para. 164 (Certification Decision).
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It is important to reiterate that Imax is not the only word on the
subject.33 Other courts have considered (and rejected) the possibility of
certifying global class actions on facts similar to those of Imax. In
McKenna v. Gammon Gold Inc.,34 for instance, plaintiffs sought to certify a
global class of investors who had purchased shares of the defendant
corporation (a gold and silver producer) on either the primary or the
secondary market.35 In Gammon Gold, the defendant was incorporated in
Québec, based in Nova Scotia and ran its mining operations out of Mexico.
The Ontario court held that it would not be appropriate to certify a global
class action in these circumstances, observing that “the acquisition of those
securities in a jurisdiction outside Canada would not give rise to a
reasonable expectation that the acquiror’s rights would be determined by a
court in Canada.”36 The court in Gammon Gold cited an earlier decision in
McCann v. CP Ships, in which Justice Rady observed:
It is difficult to understand the basis on which an Ontario court could
33
Imax is not the only case to have certified a global class; however, it is the case that
provides the most extensive discussion of the global class issue. In Dobbie v. Arctic Glacier
Income Fund, Justice Tausendfreund certified a global class of persons who had purchased
shares of the defendant corporation during the class period. Citing Imax, the court found at
para. 202 that “the lack of territorial limitations to the proposed class [was] not a barrier to
certification.” 2011 ONSC 25, para. 202 (Can.). Note that the Arctic Glacier case settled in
early 2012 for CDN $13.75 million. Arctic Glacier Settles Canadian Securities Class
Action,
ARTIC
GLACIER
INCOME
FUND
(Feb.
8,
2012),
http://www.arcticglacierinc.com/pdf/news/ 2012/NR20120208.pdf. See also Ramdath v.
George Brown College, [2010] O.J. No. 1411 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (certifying a global
class of students who alleged misrepresentation in connection with the defendant college’s
promotional literature). Some courts have certified classes that lack apparent territorial
limitations, but without any mention of the conflict of laws issues that such class actions
present. See, e.g., Silver v. Imax Corp. (2009), 86 C.P.C. 6th 273, at para. 124 (Certification
Decision) (noting that “[c]lasses including international members have been certified by
Ontario courts without any detailed consideration of the jurisdictional issues in Bendall v.
McGhan Medical Corp. (1993), 14 O.R. 3d 734 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (breast implant case—no
territorial limitation on class members); Robertson v. Thomson Corp. (1999), 43 O.R. 3d 161
(Ont. Gen. Div.) (class comprised of creators and/or owners of copyright in and to certain
works published in Canada in print media); Cheung v. Kings Land Development Inc. (2001),
55 O.R. 3d 747 (Ont. S.C.J.), leave to appeal refused [2002] O.J. No. 336 (Div. Ct.) (class
included Hong Kong residents); Brimner v. Via Rail Canada Inc. (2000), 50 O.R. 3d 114
(Ont. S.C.J.) (class comprised of all persons traveling on a Windsor-Toronto train).
International classes have been certified for settlement purposes in Nutech Brands Inc. v. Air
Canada, [2008] O.J. No. 1065 (Ont. S.C.J.) and Mondor [Settlement]”).
34
2010 ONSC 1591 (Can.).
35
Id. at para. 81 (“The description of the Class is broad: All persons, [other than certain
excluded persons related to the parties] who acquired securities of [Gammon] during the
period from the opening of trading on October 10, 2006 to the close of trading on August 10,
2007 (the ‘Class Period’), whether over a stock exchange, or pursuant to a prospectus, or
otherwise”).
36
Id. at para. 116.
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or should take jurisdiction over the [foreign] class members as
proposed. Where is the real and substantial connection between, for
example, the Ontario Court and a French citizen residing in France
who purchased securities over the TSE? It strikes me as judicial
hubris to conclude that an Ontario court would have jurisdiction in
those circumstances.37

Whether the Imax or the (more conservative) Gammon Gold approach
to global classes will ultimately prevail remains to be seen. But, for now,
the dominant opinion seems to be that Imax has ushered in a new era—one
in which Ontario’s courts are going global.
III. SITUATING SILVER V. IMAX IN THE GLOBAL LITIGATION
LANDSCAPE
Prior to deconstructing the conflict of laws issues associated with
global classes in Canada, it is important to examine the broader context in
which Imax was decided. Courts in the United States have been
considering whether to certify global class actions (usually referred to as
“transnational” class actions) for decades. Although global class actions
have been brought in a wide variety of substantive subject areas, including
product liability, mass tort, consumer protection, breach of contract and
antitrust, the majority of such actions have been in the securities litigation
area.38 American courts have differed on the propriety of certifying global
class actions. Some courts have certified global class actions on the basis
that they represent a vehicle through which the claims of all aggrieved
claimants, both domestic and foreign, can be resolved. Other courts,
however, have rejected global class actions, citing concerns about
manageability, subject-matter jurisdiction, comity, and the like.39
The 1990’s and 2000’s witnessed a new type of global securities class
action: the “foreign-cubed” or “f-cubed” class action. An “f-cubed” class
action is an action brought under U.S. securities laws by foreign plaintiffs
who purchased or sold securities of a foreign issuer on a foreign stock
exchange.40 After a period of uncertainty about the fate of the f-cubed class
action, the U.S. Supreme Court in Morrison dealt them a fatal blow. In

37

Id. at para. 100 (quoting McCann v. CP Ships, [2009] O.J. No. 5182, para. 83 (Can.)).
See, e.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities
Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 14 (2007); Stephen
J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities Class-Action
Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 465 (2009).
39
See Buxbaum, supra note 38, at 39–41 (chronicling reasons for dismissal in a dataset
of forty-five “f-cubed” securities class actions).
40
The term was originally coined in Stuart M. Grant & Diane Zilka, The Role of Foreign
Investors in Federal Securities Class Actions Ser. No. B-1442, PLI CORPORATE LAW AND
PRACTICE HANDBOOK 91, 96 (2004).
38
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Morrison, shareholders sued National Australia Bank (NAB) in federal
district court in New York in connection with a write-down of the value of
NAB’s subsidiary, HomeSide Lending, a company headquartered in Florida
that was in the business of servicing mortgages.41 Even though NAB’s
ordinary shares were not traded on any exchange in the United States,
plaintiffs sought to sue under American securities laws for a violation of
sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC
Rule 10b–5. While the parties and the courts below had framed the issue as
one of subject-matter jurisdiction,42 the Court considered the extraterritorial
reach of section 10(b) to raise instead a “merits question.” The Court noted
that “[i]t is a longstanding principle of American law that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”43 Because there was “no
affirmative indication” that section 10(b) was intended to apply
extraterritorially, the Court refused to apply it to the foreign conduct at
issue.44 Thus, foreign claimants did not have a cause of action under U.S.
securities laws to sue foreign issuers in respect of purchases or sales of
securities that took place on foreign exchanges. The Supreme Court then
enunciated the “transactional test” for the application of the Exchange Act:
section 10(b) will only apply when “the purchase or sale is made in the
United States, or involves a security listed on a domestic exchange.”45
Since the plaintiffs in Morrison were seeking to advance a claim involving
a purchase and sale of shares that occurred outside the United States, they
failed to satisfy the Court’s transactional test and their claims were
accordingly dismissed.46 In the two years since Morrison was decided,
41

On July 5, 2001, National Australia Bank (NAB) announced that it was writing down
the value of HomeSide’s assets by $450 million. On September 3, it announced an
additional write-down of $1.75 billion. HomeSide allegedly used fraudulent assumptions in
its models that valued its “mortgage-servicing rights” (MSRs), which were subsequently
incorporated into NAB’s publicly filed financial statements. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875–
76. After the write-downs, NAB’s stock price dropped by nearly 13% on the Australian
Stock Exchange. Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 2008),
aff’d 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
42
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877. In the case law leading up to Morrison, the issue of
whether foreign plaintiffs could sue under U.S. securities law was thought to be one of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Courts had used the “conduct” and “effects” tests (or some
“admixture” of both) to determine whether the foreign fraud was sufficiently related to the
United States to justify the assumption of subject-matter jurisdiction over the case.
43
Id. (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (internal
quotations omitted)).
44
Id. at 2883.
45
Id. at 2886.
46
Although Morrison involved a private cause of action under section 10(b), its
reasoning would also seem to foreclose the possibility of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) bringing an action where the purchases or sales of securities were
consummated outside the United States. One month after Morrison was decided, Congress
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lower courts have interpreted the case strictly to foreclose the claims of
foreign purchasers who do not satisfy either the letter or spirit of
Morrison.47 Post-Morrison, it seems that the United States is no longer the
haven for global securities litigation that it had been for decades prior.48
Just as the United States was exiting the global securities litigation
game, Canada was entering it.
A statutory cause of action for
misrepresentation in connection with the primary offering of securities has
been available in Canada49 since the 1970’s.50 However given fee-shifting
enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“DoddFrank Act”). Section 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the Exchange Act to
essentially reinstate the “conduct and effects” test as it concerns actions brought by the SEC.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841–49 (2010); see generally Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v.
National Australia Bank and the Future of Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Securities
Laws, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 537, 538 (2011) (noting that the amendment “seems intended to undo
the Court’s opinion in Morrison, at least as far as actions brought by the Securities and
Exchange Commission” but that such amendment “as drafted may be ineffective, due to a
procedural aspect of the Supreme Court’s holding in Morrison.”). Further, Section 929Y(a)
of the Dodd-Frank Act directed the SEC to solicit public commentary and to conduct a study
to determine whether, and to what extent, the Exchange Act should regulate transnational
securities fraud cases. For the SEC’s report, see SEC, STUDY ON THE CROSS-BORDER SCOPE
OF THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 10(B) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
OF 1934 (2012).
47
See, e.g., In re Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F.Supp.2d 327
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, 729 F.Supp.2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In
re Société Générale Sec. Litig., No. 1:08-cv-02495 (RMB), 2010 WL 3910286 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 29, 2010). For discussion of the state of U.S. law post-Morrison, see Beyea, supra
note 46, at 538; George Conway et al., Harmony and Dissonance in Extraterritorial
Regulation, AM. SOC’Y 105TH ANNUAL MEETINGS PROCEEDINGS (2011); Elizabeth Cosenza,
Paradise Lost: § 10(B) After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 343
(2011); Roger W. Kirby, Access to U.S. Courts By Purchasers of Foreign Listed Securities
in the Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 223
(2011); Richard Painter et al., When Courts and Congress Don’t Say What they Mean: Initial
Reactions to Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2011); Silberman, supra note 1.
48
The mid-1990’s also saw the introduction of heightened pleading requirements in U.S.
securities litigation. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 5A FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 1301.1 (3d ed. 1998) (“As a result of the enactment of the [Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995], if a complaint asserts that the defendant made misleading
statements or omissions in an action under the securities law, the pleader must specify each
statement alleged to have been misleading and the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading. The statute also specifies that if an allegation regarding the statement or
omission is made on information and belief, the complaint must state with particularity all
facts on which the pleader’s belief is formed. Finally, in a securities action in which the
plaintiff must establish that the defendant acted with a ‘particular state of mind,’ which in
most instances is a reference to the defendant’s having acted with ‘scienter,’ the plaintiff
must ‘state with particularity’ facts giving ‘rise to a strong inference’ that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind.”).
49
Note that in Canada securities are regulated provincially, not federally (as they
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considerations and the absence of a class action mechanism, few actions
were initially pursued under these primary market civil liability provisions.
Moreover, the primary market liability provisions were seen as inadequate
to protect the investing public, given that 95% of capital markets activity in
Canada is in the secondary market.51 After an extended period of legislative
debate, Canadian provinces began to modify their securities legislation to
provide for statutory secondary market liability. This development, coupled
with the enactment of class proceedings legislation in most provinces,52
“open[ed] the door to the robust involvement of so-called ‘private attorneys
general’ in enforcing the norms of securities law.”53 It is against this
backdrop that global securities class actions in Canada came to develop.
This prospective shift in global securities litigation from the United
States to alternative forums such as Canada illustrate what Quintanilla and
Whytock describe as “the new multipolarity” in transnational litigation.54
They posit that the era where the U.S. was the epicenter of global litigation
has passed and that transnational litigation is entering an era of increasing
multipolarity.55 This increased multipolarity “may be due to changes in the
U.S. legal system that make it less attractive to transnational litigants.”56
Alternatively, it may be attributable to “changes in other countries’ legal
primarily are in the United States).
50
The statutory cause of action was designed to overcome some of the issues presented
by the common law cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, which requires proof of
individual reliance. Canadian courts have not adopted the U.S. doctrine of “fraud on the
market.” See Carom v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., (1998) 41 O.R. 780 (Can. Ont. Ct. J.).
51
Pritchard & Sarra, supra note 7, at 882.
52
Later, the Supreme Court of Canada in Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v.
Dutton would hold that all provinces could certify class actions even in the absence of class
proceedings legislation under their “inherent power to settle the rules of practice and
procedure as to disputes brought before them.” [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534, paras. 31–34 (Can.).
Note that Prince Edward Island is the only province not to have comprehensive class
proceedings legislation in place.
53
Condon, supra note 21, at 34.
54
Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New Multipolarity in
Transnational Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments and Foreign Law 18 SW. J.
INT'L L. 31, 34–35 (2011).
55
Canada is not the only jurisdiction that is generating a buzz as being a potential
alternate forum for the resolution of mass disputes. The 2005 Dutch Act on the Collective
Settlement of Mass Claims (known as “WCAM”) has also sparked debates about the
Netherlands being a potentially viable forum for the settlement of collective disputes. Note,
however, that the WCAM does not permit the adjudication of mass disputes, but rather is a
settlement-only vehicle. For a discussion of the Dutch Act, see Tomas Arons & Willem H.
Van Boom, Beyond Tulips and Cheese: Exporting Mass Securities Claim Settlements from
The Netherlands, 21 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 857 (2010) (examining issues of international
jurisdiction, cross-border recognition, res judicata and enforcement of opt-out securities
settlements under the WCAM 2005 with a view to answering the question: “Have the Dutch
found a new export product with the enactment of the WCAM 2005?”).
56
Quintanilla & Whytock, supra note 54, at 5.
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systems that make them more attractive to litigants.”57 In the case of global
securities class actions, it seems to be a little bit of both.
What does this increased multipolarity mean for the United States?
More specifically, how does the potential migration of global class actions
from the United States to Canada impact the former? There are at least
three U.S. “constituents” that may be affected by the emergence of global
class actions in Canada: absent U.S. plaintiffs who unwittingly form part of
a Canadian global class action; prospective U.S. defendants who may be
facing the risk of global class litigation in Canada; and U.S. courts that will
need to decide what this recent development in foreign law means for U.S.
class action jurisprudence.
First, if Canadian courts continue to certify global classes, U.S.
claimants may find themselves increasingly subject to the Canadian class
action regime. One commentator notes, “[i]f the Ontario appellate
courts . . . embrace the IMAX rationale for certifying a global class,
investors outside Canada, particularly American investors, may be more
likely to pursue (and/or be swept into) Ontario-based class actions.”58 As a
practical matter, this means that U.S. claimants will be foreclosed from
initiating suit in Canada in respect of the same claims unless they opt-out of
the Canadian class action. It may also mean that U.S. claimants are
foreclosed from pursuing similar claims in U.S. courts depending on
whether (and to what extent) a U.S. court ascribes res judicata effect to a
Canadian judgment or settlement.
Second, if Imax marks a trend in the certification of global classes,
American defendants may find themselves at increased risk of litigation
exposure in Canada. While Imax itself involved a Canadian defendant, the
time will inevitably come when plaintiffs seek to certify global classes
against American defendants. At least two current cases foreshadow this
development. First, in 2008, plaintiffs initiated a national class action
against a large American multinational, American International Group
(AIG), arising out of AIG’s credit default swaps and “the crippling decline
in AIG’s stock price when the true effect of those credit default swaps
became known to the investing public.”59 While the putative class is
limited to Canadian residents, the case is significant as it seeks certification
against a foreign issuer in respect of shares purchased on a foreign
exchange.60 The AIG case was adjourned indefinitely pending the Supreme
57

Id.
Emily Cole, Recent Developments in Canadian Securities Class-Action Law, ABA
SEC. LITIG. J., Summer 2010, at 13.
59
Class
Actions:
American
International
Group,
Inc.,
SISKINDS,
http://www.classaction.ca/actions/Securities/Current-Actions/American-International-GroupInc--%28A-I-G%29.aspx (last visited May 14, 2012).
60
In the parlance of U.S. securities law, the AIG case is a Canadian “f-squared” case:
Canadian plaintiffs suing a foreign issuer in respect of shares purchased on a foreign
58
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Court of Canada’s decision in Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda.61 The Van
Breda decision, which was released by the Supreme Court in April 2012,
defined the common law test for jurisdiction over an ex juris defendant.62
Second, in June, 2010, plaintiffs launched a global class action on behalf of
“all persons, wherever they may reside” who purchased shares of a
Canadian corporation, Canadian Solar, during the class period.63 Notably,
while the defendant corporation is domiciled in Canada, it traded its shares
exclusively on a U.S. exchange.64 These cases telegraph the reality that if
the Imax holding stands, it is simply a matter of time before American
defendants face the prospect of global class actions in Ontario.65
Finally, the emergence of global class actions in Canada poses “new
managerial issues for U.S. [courts].”66 Most significantly, U.S. courts will
likely need to decide whether to recognize and grant res judicata effect to a
Canadian judgment purporting to bind absent U.S. class members. This
issue will arise when an American class member seemingly bound by the
Canadian proceedings seeks to re-litigate the case in a U.S. court and is
faced with the defense that the Canadian judgment or settlement precludes
the U.S. class member from litigating in the U.S. To date, no U.S. court has
had the occasion to consider this issue. In addition, the availability of
global class actions in Canada will also impact the Rule 23 certification
analysis for U.S. courts. U.S. courts will be increasingly obligated to

exchange.
61
2012 SCC 17 (Can.).
62
For commentary on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Van Breda, see Vaughan Black
& Mat Brechtel, Revising Muscutt: The Ontario Court of Appeal Takes Another Look, 36
ADVOCATES’ Q. 35 (2009); Joost Blom, The Challenge of Jurisdiction: Van Breda v. Village
Resorts and Black v. Breeden, 49 CAN. BUS. L. J. 400 (2010); Tanya Monestier, A ‘Real and
Substantial’ Improvement?: Van Breda Reformulates the Law of Jurisdiction in Ontario,
2010 ANN. REV. OF CIV. LITIG. 185; Dwight Newman, Van Breda, Ontario CA’s
Clarification on Jurisdiction Creates Confusion, LAW. WKLY., Mar. 5, 2010, at 5, available
at http://www.lawyersweekly-digital.com/lawyersweekly/2940/#pg4; Stephen Pitel,
Reformulating a Real and Substantial Connection, 60 U.N.B. L. J. 177, 184 (2009).
63
Class Actions: Canadian Solar, Inc., SISKINDS, http://www.classaction.ca/actions/
Securities/Current-Actions/Canadian-Solar-Inc.aspx (last visited May 14, 2012).
64
Mark L. Berenblut et al., Trends in Canadian Securities Class Actions: 2010 Update
Climbing to New Heights—the Number of Active Cases is at its Highest, NERA ECONOMIC
CONSULTING, 2 (Jan. 31, 2011), available at http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_
Recent_Trends_Canada_0111.pdf.
65
Such a development, however, may actually be a welcome one from the perspective of
an American defendant. One commentator observes that “[d]efendants may decide to wager
a bet that a Canadian settlement will be lower than an American one. Accordingly, we may
see defendants arguing strenuously in favour of a Canadian resolution to a global class
action.” Cole, supra note 58, at 16.
66
Deborah R. Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions and ThirdParty Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306, 310 (2011).
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determine whether a U.S. action is a “superior”67 way of proceeding in the
face of a global class action in Canada. The development of a global class
action regime in Canada will also affect the forum non conveniens inquiry
undertaken by U.S. courts. In particular, U.S. courts will now need to
incorporate considerations of comity and multiplicity in deciding whether it
is appropriate to stay proceedings in favor of another forum—a foreign
forum, no less. Lastly, the existence of global class actions in Canada will
impact the notice given to U.S. class members, as well as the potential
settlement of U.S. class claims.68 Notice to U.S. class members will need to
be crafted against the reality that U.S. class members may also receive a
Canadian notice. And any settlement of a U.S. class action will likely
require coordinating with a Canadian court to avoid gaps and redundancies.
Thus, the United States should not view the certification of global
class actions in Canada as merely an “interesting” development abroad.
Rather, the emergence of global class actions in Canada has the potential to
have a significant impact on class members, defendants, and courts south of
the forty-ninth parallel. Of course, all this depends on whether global class
actions in Canada are here to stay, which in turn hinges on whether
Canadian courts can resolve the complicated conflict of laws questions
associated with the certification of global classes.
As two U.S.
commentators note, “[h]ow [the conflict of laws] issues develop in IMAX
will be closely watched in the U.S. and elsewhere.”69
IV. CONFLICT OF LAWS ISSUES RAISED BY GLOBAL CLASSES
The Imax decision failed to appreciate the complexity of the conflict of
laws issues raised by global classes and their impact on certification.
Indeed, while much of the focus in Imax has been on what the case means
for secondary market misrepresentation actions, the legacy of Imax will
likely be the precedent it sets for the creation of global classes.70
But, how appropriate was it for the court to certify a global class in
Imax? What are the relevant considerations in certifying a global class
generally? How do conflict of laws issues play out when foreign class
members are swept into a Canadian class action? These are the issues that
have received little academic or judicial attention to date and that this
Article seeks to address. While the relevant conflict of laws considerations
dovetail with one another (and with the statutory requirements for
67

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (Under Rule 23(b)(3), in order to certify a class action, a court
must find, inter alia, that “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”).
68
See infra Part IV.D.
69
Warren & Howatt, supra note 11, at 34.
70
See id. at 33–36 (“The more likely lasting impact of the IMAX decision will be the
conflict-of-laws issues that will inevitably be raised when non-resident investors, particularly
Americans, are unwittingly caught in a Canadian global class.”).
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certification), I have attempted to tease them out individually to the extent
possible. Consequently, I look separately at the issues of jurisdiction
simpliciter, recognition of class judgments, choice of law, parallel
proceedings, and notice/procedural rights.
A. Jurisdiction Simpliciter
Imax is one of the first cases to consider whether, and under what
circumstances, an Ontario court has judicial jurisdiction over a foreign class
plaintiff, as opposed to a non-resident class plaintiff (i.e., a Canadian
claimant who resides outside the forum province).71 Is the analysis any
different? Should it be? There is serious academic debate about whether
national class actions in Canada are constitutionally permissible—that is,
whether courts in one province have the power to adjudicate in class form
the claims of non-resident class members.72 Given the fact that Canadian
law is not settled with respect to the creation of a national class, it is
surprising that Canadian courts would purport to assert jurisdiction over an
international class. Nonetheless, that is exactly what the Imax court did.
The jurisdictional analysis is said to proceed from the Supreme Court
of Canada’s seminal decision in Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye.73
Morguard involved an action to enforce a default judgment rendered by an
Alberta court in the province of British Columbia. Because the defendant
in Morguard had not consented to the jurisdiction of the Alberta courts, nor
was it served with process in Alberta, the judgment was not enforceable
under existing common law standards.74 The Morguard Court viewed this
result as illogical: if it was appropriate for an Alberta court to assume

71
For the purposes of this Article, I will distinguish between “foreign” class members
(those class members who reside outside of Canada) and “non-resident” class members
(those Canadian class members who reside in Canada, but outside the forum province).
Reference to “absent” class members encompasses both “foreign” and “non-resident” class
members.
72
See, e.g., Jeffrey Haylock, The National Class as Extraterritorial Legislation, 32
DALHOUSIE L.J. 253 (2009); Peter W. Hogg & S. Gordon McKee, Are National Class
Actions Constitutional?, 26 NAT’L J. OF CONST. L. 279 (2010); Colin K. Irving & Mathieu
Bouchard, National Opt Out Class Actions, a Constitutional Assessment, 26 NAT’L J. OF
CONST. L. 111 (2009); Stephen Lamont, The Problem of the National Class: Extraterritorial Class Definitions and the Jurisdiction of the Court, 24 ADVOCATES’ Q. 252 (2001)
[hereinafter Lamont]; S. Gordon McKee & Jeff Galway, Constitutional Considerations
Concerning National Class Actions, in LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA: SPECIAL LECTURES
2001–CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 27 (2002); F. Paul Morrison et al., The
Rise and Possible Demise of the National Class in Canada, 1 CAN. CLASS ACTION REV. 67
(2004); Janet Walker, Are National Class Actions Constitutional? – A Reply to Hogg and
McKee, 48 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 95 (2010).
73
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 (Can.).
74
As a predicate to enforcing a judgment at common law, the enforcing court must
ensure that the judgment court properly assumed jurisdiction over the defendant.
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jurisdiction (because there was a significant factual nexus between the
dispute and Alberta), why should the judgment not be enforceable in British
Columbia? Although Morguard was technically a case about the
enforcement of foreign judgments,75 it is credited with enunciating the “real
and substantial connection” test for the assertion of personal jurisdiction
over out-of-province defendants.76 A court properly assumes jurisdiction
over an ex juris defendant where there is a sufficiently close nexus between
the dispute and the provincial forum—in other words, a “real and
substantial connection.”77 So long as a court properly assumes jurisdiction
under the real and substantial connection test, any judgment rendered by
that court will be enforceable across Canada.
Courts have uniformly assumed that the real and substantial
connection test articulated in Morguard that governs the question of
jurisdiction over an out-of-province defendant applies equally to a separate
jurisdictional question: whether a Canadian province has jurisdiction over
absent non-resident class plaintiffs.78 The issue of personal jurisdiction
over plaintiffs is a unique one that does not arise in traditional two-party
litigation. This is because, in a non-class case, personal jurisdiction over
the plaintiff is predicated on the plaintiff having selected the forum.79 In the
vernacular of private international law, the plaintiff has “consented” or
“submitted” to the jurisdiction of a certain court by initiating proceedings
there. The situation is different with a class of absent plaintiffs; by
definition, they cannot consent or submit to the jurisdiction of a court.
Consequently, a court must consider the separate and distinct question of
75

Note that an Alberta judgment is considered “foreign” to a British Columbia court in
the same way that an Austrian or Venezuelan judgment would be. See Beals v. Saldanha,
2003 SCC 72, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416, para. 19 (Can.) (noting that there is no “principled
reason” why foreign judgments should not be treated in the same way as judgments issued
by sister provinces).
76
It is a well-established principle of the Canadian conflict of laws that jurisdiction for
enforcement purposes and personal jurisdiction are correlated. In the words of Justice La
Forest in Morguard, “[t]he taking of jurisdiction by a court in one province and its recognition
in another must be viewed as correlatives.” 3 S.C.R. 1077, at para. 42. Thus, in setting out the
real and substantial connection test for judgment enforcement purposes, the Court in
Morguard also set out the test for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a defendant.
77
The real and substantial connection test is Canada’s analogue to the U.S.’s “minimum
contacts” test.
78
See, e.g., McCutcheon v. The Cash Store, [2006] 80 O.R. 3d 644 (Can.); VitaPharm
Can. Ltd. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., [2002] O.J. No. 298, aff’d Ford v. F. Hoffmann-La
Roche Ltd., [2005] 74 O.R. 3d 758 (Can.); Wilson v. Servier, [2000] 50 O.R. 3d 219 (Can.);
Harrington v. Dow Corning Corp., [2000] 193 D.L.R. 4th 67 (Can.).
79
See, e.g., Geneviève Saumier, USA-Canada Class Actions: Trading in Procedural
Fairness, 5 GLOBAL JURIST ADVANCES 1, 18 (2005) (“The typical foreign money-judgment
does not give rise to [the question of jurisdiction over the plaintiff] because the plaintiff, by
choosing the foreign court as the forum for litigation, has necessarily attorned to its
jurisdiction in a way that cannot later be disputed at the recognition stage.”).
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whether it has personal jurisdiction over the absent plaintiff class, such that
it can bind the class to judgment.80
In Canada, courts have applied the same real and substantial
connection test that was developed in Morguard to ground personal
jurisdiction over an out-of-province defendant in two-party litigation to the
question of jurisdiction over non-resident class plaintiffs. It is not clear,
however, that the real and substantial connection test is the appropriate one
to govern the question of jurisdiction over non-resident plaintiffs, much less

80

The case law has largely failed to define precisely who the court is asserting personal
jurisdiction over in the class context: the defendant, the defendant in respect of the claims of
non-resident plaintiffs, or the non-resident plaintiff class. This absence of clear delineation
between the three has muddied the jurisdictional waters and caused additional uncertainty in
this area of law. In my article, Personal Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Class Members:
Have We Gone Down the Wrong Road?, I highlight this distinction through the following
example:
Tire Co., an American manufacturer of allegedly defective tires, is sued in Ontario
by a class of plaintiffs who have purchased and used Tire Co.’s tires in Canada.
Depending on the scope of the class, Tire Co. may have several jurisdictional
arguments:
Scenario One: If the class is limited to Ontario plaintiffs, Tire Co. may argue that
the court does not have jurisdiction over Tire Co. because none of the traditional
bases of jurisdiction – presence, consent, real and substantial connection – have
been satisfied. Scenario One involves a classic challenge by a defendant on
jurisdictional grounds.
Scenario Two: If the class purports to cover both Ontario and non-Ontario
plaintiffs, Tire Co. may concede that the court has jurisdiction over Tire Co. in
respect of the claims of the Ontario plaintiffs, but may argue that the court does not
have jurisdiction over Tire Co. in respect of the claims of non-resident plaintiffs.
The argument would be that there is no real and substantial connection between
the forum (Ontario) and the action as it concerns the non-resident class members.
Scenario Three: If the class purports to cover both Ontario and non-Ontario
plaintiffs, Tire Co. may attempt to argue that the Ontario court does not have
jurisdiction over the non-resident class members because there is no real and
substantial connection between such class members and the forum.
Scenarios Two and Three are functionally very similar, in that they can result in a
determination that a court lacks jurisdiction to render a binding judgment; for that
reason courts have tended to conflate the two. However, the questions are
conceptually distinct in that the former asks whether the court has the power to
bind the defendant, whereas the latter addresses whether the court has the ability to
bind non-resident class members.
Tanya Monestier, Personal Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Class Members: Have We Gone
Down the Wrong Road?, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 537, 543–44 (2010).
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foreign plaintiffs.81 The Morguard real and substantial connection test
developed to fill a perceived void in the common law of jurisdiction as it
concerned a defendant in non-class litigation. Thus, Walker argues that
“while the Morguard principles may provide inspiration for the answers we
seek, . . . [the] decision cannot supply the details of the standards and
practices” since Morguard was fundamentally a case about the preclusive
effect of judgments as they affect the interests of named parties.82
Unfortunately, Canadian courts seemed to have overlooked this fact, and
have uncritically accepted that the Morguard real and substantial
connection test necessarily governs the issue of jurisdiction over nonresident plaintiffs.
Broad support for distinguishing between absent defendants and absent
plaintiffs in the jurisdictional analysis can be found in the U.S. Supreme
Court’s landmark decision in Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts.83 In Shutts, a
Kansas state court certified a national class consisting of 33,000 gas
company investors who had sued to recover interest on royalty payments
that had been delayed by the defendant. Notably, over 99% of the gas
leases in question and 97% of the plaintiff class members had “no apparent
connection” to Kansas, the forum state. The defendant asserted that the
Kansas courts could exercise jurisdiction over out-of-state plaintiffs only if
the plaintiffs possessed sufficient “minimum contacts” with Kansas so as to
justify the assertion of jurisdiction over them. The U.S. Supreme Court
disagreed that the minimum contacts test was apposite in this context,
81

Walker argues that “[a] fixed requirement of a real and substantial connection between
each claim and the forum in a multi-jurisdictional class action is no more required by the
constitutionally mandated rules of the conflict of laws than it is by the text of the
Constitution or its interpretation by the Supreme Court of Canada.” Walker, supra note 72,
at 132.
82
Janet Walker, Recognizing Multijurisdiction Class Action Judgments Within Canada:
Key Questions—Suggested Answers, 46 CAN. BUS. L.J. 450, 451 (2008) [hereinafter Walker,
Recognizing Multijurisdiction]. Walker argues further:
While the Morguard decision concerned the “law of jurisdiction” generally, it is
important to understand that its reasons were developed primarily to address
questions of indirect jurisdiction or “jurisdiction in the international sense,” and
only by implication, to address questions of direct jurisdiction. Thus, it would be a
mistake to infer that the Morguard decision gave rise to a specific test for direct
jurisdiction that governs the courts’ authority to certify multijurisdictional class
actions.
Walker, supra note 72, at 115. See also Celeste Poltak, Ontario and Her Sisters: Should
Full Faith and Credit Apply to the National Class?, 3 CAN. CLASS ACTION REV. 437, 451
(2000) (“Given the significant differences between a traditional two-party lawsuit and multijurisdictional class proceedings, a slavish adherence to the analogy of a foreign defendant
cannot adequately capture the legal dynamics and complexities of situations involving an
unnamed plaintiff in modern cross-border class action litigation.”).
83
472 U.S. 797 (1985).
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noting the significant differences that exist between absent class members
and absent defendants. The Court emphasized that the burdens placed upon
an absent plaintiff are “not of the same order and magnitude” as those
placed on an ex juris defendant—a defendant must hire counsel, participate
in discovery, and face the prospect of liability for damages.84 Accordingly,
due process mandated that there be minimum contacts between the
defendant and the forum state. By contrast, an absent plaintiff is “not haled
anywhere to defend [himself] upon pain of a default judgment.”85 Rather,
the litigation is for the benefit of the absent plaintiff, with the court and
class representative there to protect his interests. Although grounded in
constitutional principles which differ from those in Canada, the Shutts
decision recognizes that an ex juris named defendant and an absent class
member are not similarly situated so as to warrant identical jurisdictional
treatment. It would be fitting for Canadian courts to recognize the
important distinctions between jurisdiction over an ex juris defendant and
jurisdiction over an absent plaintiff class rather than trying to shoehorn the
real and substantial connection test into a scenario for which it was not
designed.86
Assuming, for the moment, that the real and substantial connection test
should govern the question of jurisdiction over absent class members,
courts in Canada have not yet resolved what it means for there to be a “real
and substantial connection” between the provincial forum and a nonresident plaintiff class. In other words, Canadian courts are still straining to
define the substance of the real and substantial connection test in the intraprovincial class setting.87 Some provincial courts (in particular, those in
Ontario and British Columbia) have adopted an approach to the real and
substantial connection test that focuses on the commonality of interest
between the claims of resident and non-resident class members.88 Under
this view of the jurisdictional test, the real and substantial connection is to
be found in the identity of interest that non-resident class members share
with resident class members in resolving common issues.89 Other
provincial courts (such as those in Saskatchewan and Québec) have
84

Id. at 808.
Id. at 809.
86
See Joost Blom & Elizabeth Edinger, The Chimera of the Real and Substantial
Connection Test, 38 U.B.C. L. REV. 373 (2005).
87
This is hardly surprising considering there is still major uncertainty surrounding the
application of the real and substantial connection test in its traditional settling. See Club
Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17 (Can.).
88
Strangely, courts in British Columbia need not resort to this logic, as the B.C.
legislation prescribes an “opt-in” regime for non-resident class plaintiffs. Under an opt-in
regime, jurisdiction over the non-resident plaintiff class is founded on consent—i.e., the nonresident class members have consented to the jurisdiction of the B.C. court through the act of
opting-in.
89
See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Cash Store Inc., [2006] 80 O.R. 3d 644 (Can.).
85
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endorsed a more restrictive view of the real and substantial connection test,
whereby an actual connection—in the sense of a link or nexus—is required
to ground jurisdiction.90 These courts eschew an approach to the real and
substantial connection that requires “creating” a connection between the
forum and the non-resident class members through the conduit of the
common issues shared by resident class members.
Given that Canadian courts have not yet worked out the content of the
real and substantial connection test as it applies domestically (i.e. to nonresident class members), it is difficult to know how to apply the test
internationally. What does it mean for there to be a real and substantial
connection between foreign claimants and a provincial forum? Is a
commonality of interest between resident class members and foreign class
members sufficient to ground jurisdiction? Should the real and substantial
connection test account for the fact that a provincial court is purporting to
extend its reach to individuals outside the country? Should the threshold
“connection” for foreign claimants be higher than that for non-resident
claimants?
The court in Imax proceeded for jurisdictional purposes as if there
were no appreciable difference between a provincial court adjudicating the
claims of non-resident class members and a provincial court adjudicating
the claims of foreign class members.91 In finding that there was a real and
substantial connection between the forum and the absent class members
(both non-resident and foreign), Justice van Rensburg stated:
IMAX is a CBCA [Canadian Business Corporations Act] corporation
with its head office in Ontario. It is a reporting issuer under the OSA
and its shares are traded on the TSX. The alleged Representation was
made in Ontario through the issuance of the Company’s Form 10-K
and press releases from IMAX’s Mississauga head office (although
arguably it may have been made in IMAX’s offices in New York as
well). The alleged wrongful actions of the Individual Defendants in
connection with the preparation and reporting of IMAX’s financial
statements are alleged to have taken place in Ontario as well as New
York. The proposed common issues respecting liability that concern
the conduct of the defendants accordingly have a substantial
connection to this jurisdiction.92

Such a recitation of the relevant connections seems to be primarily
90

See, e.g., Hocking v. Haziza, [2008] R.J.Q. 1189 (Can.).
Justice van Rensburg lumped non-resident and foreign claimants together under the
heading: “The Court’s Authority to Certify National and International Classes.” Silver v.
Imax Corp., (2009) 86 C.P.C. 6th 273, para. 116 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (Certification
Decision).
92
Id. at para. 130.
91
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focused on the defendant: Imax is incorporated in Ontario; Imax sells shares
in Ontario on the TSX; Imax allegedly made misrepresentations in Ontario,
etc. Indeed, if the issue were one of jurisdiction over the defendant, it
would be clear that there exists a real and substantial connection between
Imax and Ontario. How relevant, however, are these defendant-centric
connections to the court’s jurisdiction over an absent (non-resident or
foreign) plaintiff class? Surely, it cannot be the case that the same
connections which ground jurisdiction over the defendant automatically
ground jurisdiction over an absent plaintiff class, however large in scope.
In other words, just because a court has jurisdiction over a defendant does
not de facto mean that the court also has jurisdiction over an absent plaintiff
class. However, the Imax court’s reasoning would appear to imply just
that—because Imax was properly before the court, so too were the absent
class plaintiffs (whether non-resident or foreign).93
The point is perhaps made more clearly though an examination of
certain facts in Imax.
According to the Certification Decision,
approximately 85–90% of the class members in Imax are foreign.94 While
some of these foreign class members may have purchased their shares of the
defendant company on the TSX, undoubtedly many purchased their shares
on the NASDAQ.95 A typical class member in this case, then, was likely an
American resident who purchased her shares of Imax on the NASDAQ.96
She likely never left home to do so; she probably purchased the shares
through an intermediary; and more than likely, she did not even realize that
Imax was a Canadian company.97 It would certainly come as a surprise to
her that she was part of a “global” class action in Canada—when she had
never been to Canada, did not make any purchases on a Canadian stock
93
The mistake of conflating jurisdiction over defendants with jurisdiction over absent
claimants has been made in numerous cases. For instance, in Canada Post Corp. v. Lépine,
an action in Québec to recognize a class judgment rendered by an Ontario court, the
Supreme Court of Canada concluded that “[t]here is no doubt that the Ontario Superior Court
of Justice had jurisdiction pursuant to art. 3168 C.C.Q., since the Corporation, the defendant
to the action, had its head office in Ontario.” [2009] 304 D.L.R. 539, para. 38 (Can.).
94
Silver v. Imax Corp., (2009) 86 C.P.C. 6th 273, para. 110 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)
(Certification Decision).
95
While the number is not known precisely, one can surmise that it is a significant
percentage of class members who purchased their shares on the NASDAQ based on the fact
that investors sought to certify a parallel class action in a New York court.
96
Note that Canadian class proceedings legislation does not have a requirement that the
class representative’s claims be “typical” of those of the class. By contrast, in the United
States, Rule 23(a)(3) provides: “One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all members only if: . . . (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class . . .” FED. R. CIV. P.
23(a)(3).
97
The profile of Imax on the NASDAQ website does not include any indication that
Imax is a Canadian company. Rather, an investor would need to link to Imax’s Form 10-K
filed with the SEC to discover that the company is incorporated in Canada.
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market, and did not know that the shares she was purchasing were those of
a Canadian company.
The foreseeability of suit proceeding in a certain forum appears to be a
relevant concern in assessing whether a court has jurisdiction over absent
claimants. In Currie v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada,98 the Ontario
Court of Appeal considered the circumstances under which it would enforce
a foreign class judgment purporting to bind Ontario residents. In assessing
whether the foreign court had jurisdiction over the Ontario class members
(a pre-condition to recognizing the judgment), the court indicated that the
reasonable expectations of the non-resident (Ontario) class members needed
to be considered. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs “did nothing that
could provide a basis for the assertion of [U.S.] jurisdiction” given that the
“transactions giving rise to the claims took place entirely within Ontario.” 99
Thus, the court recognized that the foreign court’s assertion of jurisdiction
might be unfair because an Ontario class member would have “no reason to
suspect that his or her rights are at stake in a foreign lawsuit.”100 While the
Imax case is certainly distinguishable from Currie, the overarching point is
that caution should be exercised when purporting to adjudicate the claims of
foreign class members who would have no reason to suspect that they
would be subject to the jurisdiction of a court in a different country. The
connections which appeared “real” and “substantial” when viewed from the
perspective of the defendant appear less so when assessed from the vantage
point of the absent claimant class.
One may still argue, however, that the connections between the forum
and the foreign claimant class are less important than the fact that the
foreign claimant class share a commonality of interest with the claimants
who are properly before the court. That is, the preceding discussion largely
assumes that the real and substantial connection test requires an actual
connection between the forum and the foreign absent plaintiff class.
However, as the Ontario jurisprudence has evolved, the requirement is
simply that non-resident/foreign claimants share an identity of interest with
resident class members in the resolution of the common issues. Such a
basis of jurisdictional reasoning is dangerously expansive, particularly in
relation to assertion of jurisdiction over foreign claimants. It would allow a
very small tail (resident claimants properly before the court) to wag a very
large dog (non-resident and foreign claimants who share a commonality of
interest). It would be odd indeed if 10% of the claimants over whom the
Ontario court properly exercised jurisdiction could, in turn, control the
jurisdictional fate of the other 90% of absent class members. Whatever the
limits of the “commonality of interest” approach within Canada, these limits
98

[2005] 250 D.L.R. 4th 224 (Can.).
Id. at para. 23; see also McKenna v. Gammon Gold Inc., 2010 ONSC 1591, para. 108
(Can.).
100
Currie v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada, 250 D.L.R. 4th 224, para. 24.
99
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are greatly magnified when writ globally.
This section was intended to illustrate the complexity of the
jurisdictional analysis and the issues that the court simply glossed over in
Imax. The jurisdictional issues are numerous: What is the appropriate test
to apply in determining jurisdiction over absent class members? Should the
jurisdictional test be that which is applied to absent defendants—i.e., the
real and substantial connection test? Is there a jurisdictional distinction
between absent non-resident class members and absent foreign class
members? How does the real and substantial connection test work when
applied to the claims of foreign class members? What are the limitations of
the “commonality of interest” approach that has developed to ground
jurisdiction over non-resident class members? As long as these crucial
questions remain unanswered, the foundations of global class actions in
Canada will remain unstable.
B. Recognition of Global Class Judgments
While the court in Imax focused its discussion primarily on
jurisdictional and choice of law issues, enforcement/recognition issues are
also highly relevant in the certification of a global class action. These
enforcement/recognition issues manifest themselves differently in the class
context than they do in the traditional two-party adjudication setting. In the
latter scenario, the question of enforcement is focused on the foreign
defendant: would a foreign court enforce a judgment rendered by a
Canadian provincial court against a foreign defendant? For instance, if an
Ontario court rendered a $10 million judgment against a defendant
domiciled in Delaware, the question would be whether a Delaware court
would enforce that money judgment.101
The question of enforcement—or, more appropriately recognition102—
is more complicated in class litigation. In the class scenario, a Canadian
court is purporting to bind not only a defendant to judgment, but also a
group of absent plaintiffs. The nature of an opt-out class action is such that
all class plaintiffs are bound to the result (whether a judgment or a

101

This presupposes that the defendant does not have assets in Ontario to satisfy the
judgment. The question of judgment enforcement will depend on the private international
law rules of the enforcing state. In Delaware, for instance, the question would be governed
by the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act. See Uniform ForeignCountry Money Judgments Recognition Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4801–12 (2011),
available at http://delcode.delaware.gov/title10/c048/.
102
“Enforcement” generally refers to the enforcement against the defendant of a
monetary sum (e.g., F2 enforcing an award by F1 of $1 million against the defendant).
“Recognition” refers instead to the recognition of a judgment as binding against the
defendant and/or plaintiff. (e.g., F2 recognizing a determination by F1 of non-liability on the
part of the defendant). In the class action context, the term “recognition” is generally more
appropriate.
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settlement)103 in the event that they fail to exclude themselves from the
proceeding. Thus, when an Ontario court certifies a national class
consisting of, say, all shareholders in Canada who purchased shares of ABC
Corp. within the class period, the goal is that the claims of all those class
members will be adjudicated or settled in the Ontario proceeding.104
However, the determination of whether those absent plaintiffs are, in fact,
bound does not rest in the purview of the certifying court. Rather, another
court in another jurisdiction will determine whether class members are
bound to the result of the Ontario action. The issue will typically arise
when a non-Ontario absent class member seeks to bring an action outside
Ontario and is met with the defense that his claims have already been
adjudicated.105
The recent Supreme Court of Canada case of Canada Post v. Lépine106
illustrates the complexity surrounding the inter-provincial enforcement of
class judgments. In Lépine, the basic question was whether a Québec court
was obligated to enforce an Ontario order certifying and approving the
settlement of a class action that included Québec residents. If so, the matter
would be res judicata against the representative plaintiff and any other
Québec resident who had not opted out of the Ontario proceeding within the

103
All references to “judgment” herein also refer to a settlement that has been granted
judicial approval.
104
With the exception, of course, of those claimants who choose to exclude themselves
through the act of opting out.
105
The issue is best illustrated in concrete terms: assume that the national class action
against ABC Corp. in Ontario purported to include the claims of Québec residents. That is,
Québec claimants had purchased shares of ABC Corp. in the class period and consequently,
those Québec claimants fell within the Ontario court’s class definition. Assume further that
the Ontario action proceeds to judgment and that an Ontario court renders a judgment for
ABC Corp. on the merits. A Québec plaintiff who falls within the class definition and who
did not opt-out of the Ontario proceeding (perhaps because he did not know that the action
was ongoing in Ontario) seeks to bring an action against ABC Corp. in Québec. Whether
this is permitted will turn on whether the Ontario judgment is binding on the Québec class
member. A judgment will not be enforceable in Québec—i.e., will not be accorded res
judicata effect—unless, inter alia, a Québec court concludes that Ontario properly asserted
jurisdiction over the Québec plaintiff (sometimes referred to as the “back-end” jurisdictional
problem). If a Québec court concludes that Ontario did not properly assert jurisdiction, the
Québec plaintiff will be able to “re”-litigate the claim. Aside from jurisdiction, there might
be other grounds upon which the enforcing forum refuses to recognize and grant preclusive
effect to the forum court’s judgment. For instance, the enforcing court may conclude that
the non-resident class member was not adequately represented or that the notice provided to
the non-resident class member was insufficient to apprise him of his rights.
106
2009 SCC 16, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 549 (Can.). For commentary on the decision, see
Geneviève Saumier, Competing Class Actions Across Canada: Still at the Starting Gate
After Canada Post v. Lépine, 48 CAN. BUS. L.J. 462 (2010) and Tanya Monestier, Lépine v.
Canada Post: Ironing Out the Wrinkles in the Inter-provincial Enforcement of Class
Judgments, 34 ADVOCATES’ Q. 499 (2008).

331

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

32:305 (2012)

relevant period.107 While the Supreme Court did not find jurisdiction to be
an impediment to enforcement,108 it did find that the notice provided
contravened “fundamental principles of procedure” within the meaning of
article 3155(3) of the Québec Civil Code. In particular, the Court was
concerned that Québec class members were not fully able to understand
their rights given the existence of a parallel class proceeding certified in
Québec. The Supreme Court thus refused to grant preclusive effect in
Québec to the Ontario class judgment. It also noted in obiter that the
certification of multi-jurisdictional classes within Canada “may sometimes
cause friction between courts in different provinces” and that “the
provincial legislatures should pay more attention to the framework for
national class actions and the problems they present.”109
As Lépine illustrates, it is far from certain that a class judgment
rendered in one Canadian province will be enforceable against non-resident
class members in another province.110 It is important to understand why
this is highly problematic as a practical matter. Enforceability and
preclusion issues are paramount in any litigation, but especially in highstakes class litigation. In particular, uncertainty as to the eventual
preclusive effect of a class judgment raises serious concerns about fairness
to the defendant.111 It is a fundamental principle of procedure that a
107
The case raised several interesting private international law issues. Among them was
the question of whether the analysis of jurisdiction at the enforcement stage should take into
account the discretionary doctrine of forum non conveniens, and whether the notion of lis
pendens could preclude enforcement of the class judgment in Québec. Note, however, that
these issues were governed by the detailed provisions of the Québec Civil Code.
108
Arguably, the Court’s analysis here was in error. The Court concluded that the
Ontario court had jurisdiction over the non-resident Québec class members because “the
Corporation, the defendant to the action, had its head office in Ontario. This connecting
factor in itself justified finding that the Ontario court had jurisdiction.” Canada Post v.
Lépine, 2009 SCC 16, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 549, para. 38 (Can.). With respect, this reasoning
fails to appreciate the distinction between the issue of whether the Ontario court properly
assumed jurisdiction over the defendant (which it clearly did), and whether it properly
assumed jurisdiction over non-Ontario absent class members. A finding of jurisdiction over
the defendant on the basis, for instance, that the defendant was domiciled in the forum
cannot ipso facto justify a finding of jurisdiction over the non-resident plaintiff class.
However, the Court appeared constrained by the strictures of the Québec Civil Code which
was not designed with class proceedings in mind, and which provides generally that “[i]n
personal actions of a patrimonial nature, the jurisdiction of a foreign authority is recognized
only in the following cases: (1) the defendant was domiciled in the country where the
decision was rendered . . . .” Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 3168 (Can.).
109
Canada Post v. Lépine, 2009 SCC 16, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 549, para. 57 (Can.).
110
This is particularly so given that courts within Canada take different views on how to
apply the real and substantial connection test.
111
See Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion Full Faith and Credit and
Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 767 (1986)
(“Preclusion rules affect litigation strategy. It is therefore important that litigants know what
the rules are . . . [T]he plaintiff should be able to predict with considerable assurance the
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defendant not be “twice-vexed” on the same cause.112 Where a provincial
court refuses to grant preclusive effect to a class judgment rendered in favor
of a defendant, the defendant will indeed be twice-vexed (and, potentially
thrice-vexed, and so on). The defendant will not benefit from a favorable
outcome on the merits where there is uncertainty surrounding the preclusive
effect of class judgments. There will always be the possibility that an
absent class member in another province will be permitted to re-litigate the
claim anew.
These concerns about preclusion are particularly pronounced in the
settlement context. The price that a defendant is willing to pay to resolve
class action litigation is generally correlated with the peace that the
defendant expects to buy.113 Where there is uncertainty surrounding
whether a class settlement will “stick” outside of the forum province, the
settlement calculus is very difficult for the defendant. In the words of one
author,
The nature and quantum of the award . . . will be based on an
estimate of the size of the plaintiff class. In the case of a multijurisdictional class, this is possible only if there is a clear indication
of whether the courts in other fora will regard the claims as
preclusively determined by the decision in the multi-jurisdictional
class action. In the absence of a clear indication of who will be
bound, a defendant will be wary of entering into negotiations to
settle the matter and a court would find it difficult to quantify an
award.114

If, for instance, the defendant pays $100 million to settle the claims of
all class members in a national class action, but additional claims are
subsequently filed in other provinces and permitted to proceed, the
defendant will have over-paid to settle the case. The defendant might then
pay another $20 million to settle the additional claims, or might be subject
to a judgment for an amount even greater than the original settlement
amount.115 The point is that the inability of the defendant to have any
rules of claim preclusion that will govern a judgment.”).
112
Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, para. 50 (Can.) (“A
common justification for the doctrine of res judicata is that a party should not be twice vexed
in the same cause, that is, the party should not be burdened with having to relitigate the same
issue”).
113
See generally Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis
Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982)
(discussing the calculus involved in choosing a settlement figure based on assessment of risk
and cost of proceeding to trial).
114
Walker, supra note 72, at 130.
115
One commentator makes the point as follows:
Whether a worldwide class is certified for settlement purposes or after a contested

333

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

32:305 (2012)

assurance of finality raises important concerns about fairness in the interprovincial class settlement context.116
These concerns are magnified when Canadian courts certify global (as
opposed to national) classes. As unsettled as the rules are within Canada,
they are even more unpredictable outside of Canada. Will a court in the
United States enforce a Canadian class judgment purporting to bind a U.S.
resident? Will a court in the United Kingdom or France enforce such a
judgment? If not, what is the point of a court in Canada including foreign
claimants in the global class to begin with? Not only does certifying a
global class in these circumstances add undue complexity to the litigation,
but it also carries the great risk of the defendant being “twice-vexed” on the
same cause. A defendant may proceed through years of protracted litigation
or settlement initiatives, only to have such efforts end up being for naught
when a foreign court refuses to accord res judicata effect to a Canadian
court’s judgment.117
The issue of the propriety of domestic courts including foreign
claimants in class actions has been considered in some detail by U.S. courts
since as early as the 1970’s.118 Defendants typically resist inclusion of
foreign claimants in U.S. class actions on the basis that such an action
provides no assurance of finality in respect of the claims of foreign class
motion, there is a significant risk that a Canadian judgment approving such a class
will not be recognized or enforced [abroad]. The result will be that defendants
who voluntarily paid for a worldwide release of their liability (in a settlement) or
who were ordered to pay damages on the basis of a “worldwide” class (after a
contested certification motion and trial) will not achieve the “global” protection
from future litigation that they expected because they could still be subject to
further litigation by “foreign” class members in foreign jurisdictions.
John Brown, Seeking Recognition of Canadian Class Action Judgments Abroad: Perils and
Pitfalls, 4 CAN. CLASS ACTION REV. 220, 220 (2008).
116
One author notes that, “[a] party should be entitled to know what they are litigating
when they embark upon a claim. In particular it is very difficult to arrange a settlement in a
class action where the defendant cannot be given the certainty of resolution.” Lamont, supra
note 72, at 291; see also id. (“Defendants have the right to expect certainty in litigation,
particularly when settling.”); Ward Branch & Christopher Rhone, Chaos or Consistency: The
National Class Action Dilemma 10 (2002) (unpublished article), available at
http://www.branchmacmaster.com/storage/articles/chaos_consistency.pdf
(“Where
a
defendant wishes to settle a class action, the calculus is different. The defendant then wishes
to ensure that the case has maximum res judicata effect. Through various procedural routes,
the Defendant will want to ensure that the action or actions cover as much of the country as
possible.”).
117
Arguably, certifying a global class is not beneficial for Canadian claimants either,
who may find the settlement value of their legitimate claims watered-down by uncertainty
engendered by the presence of foreign claimants in the case. The winners in the equation are
entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ attorneys who will eventually earn their fee based upon the global
settlement/judgment amount.
118
See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
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members.119 In particular, a foreign class member who is displeased at the
result of a U.S. proceeding (or, for that matter, who took no part in the U.S.
proceeding) will always be able to initiate subsequent proceedings in his
“home” court. If the foreign court refuses to recognize the U.S. class action
as binding on the foreign claimant and thereby allows the action to proceed,
the foreign claimant will get a “second bite at the apple.” The omnipresent
prospect of this “second bite” action in a foreign court deprives the
defendant of the potential for closure on a global scale. Whether a
judgment or settlement will be binding on foreign claimants is left to the
mercy of a foreign court.120
American courts have been attuned to the fairness arguments raised by
defendants resisting the certification of global classes. As a result, prior to
certifying a class containing foreign claimants, many U.S. courts will
attempt to ascertain whether, in the view of the U.S. court, a foreign court
would accord res judicata or preclusive effect to an eventual U.S. class
judgment.121 The more likely it is that the foreign court would grant res
judicata effect to a U.S. class judgment binding foreign citizens, the more
likely the U.S. court will include such claimants in the class definition.122
Typically, the res judicata analysis takes place under Rule 23’s
“superiority” criterion,123 which requires that a plaintiff seeking to have a
119
However, where defendants are seeking to settle an action, they will typically argue
strenuously in favor of certifying a global class action so as to resolve the maximum number
of claims.
120
See Daniel P. Shapiro & Gail H. Kim, US Class Actions with Non-US Citizens as
Class Members: Fairness Issues Considered, 11 BUS. L. INT’L 39, 41 (2010) (“The
possibility of a second action in a US court after a final determination in a class action is not
significant. Once there has been a final determination, the doctrine of res judicata bars
subsequent actions in US courts. With non-US class members in a US class action, however,
even after a final determination, it is possible that a non-US citizen could return to his home
jurisdiction to commence a redundant lawsuit because that home jurisdiction may not
recognise the validity and binding effect of the final determination in a US class action.”).
121
Rhonda Wasserman argues that U.S. courts are not going far enough in the analysis
because they fail to appreciate the distinction between recognition and preclusion. As such,
she submits that “[i]t is not enough for American courts entertaining motions to certify
transnational class actions to determine whether an American judgment will be recognized
abroad. They also need to determine the preclusive effects, if any, that the judgment will
have if it is recognized abroad.” Rhonda Wasserman, Transnational Class Actions and
Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313, 379 (2011) (emphasis added).
122
There is some international support for this approach. See, e.g., INT’L BAR ASS’N
LEGAL PRACTICE DIV., GUIDELINES FOR RECOGNISING AND ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
FOR COLLECTIVE REDRESS § 1.01 (2008) (“It is appropriate for a court to assume jurisdiction
over foreign class members if the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claim and it is
reasonable for the court to expect that its judgment will be given preclusive effect by the
jurisdictions in which the foreign class members not specifically named in the proceedings
would ordinarily seek redress.”).
123
Sometimes the issue is raised as part of forum non conveniens or as an aspect of
comity. See, e.g., In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litig., No. MD 06-1775
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class action certified under Rule 23(b)(3) establish “that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating
the controversy.”124 Where an American court determines that a foreign
court is unlikely to recognize a U.S. class judgment, it generally follows
that a U.S. class action is not a “superior” means of proceeding in respect of
the claims of those foreign plaintiffs.125 Critiques of the res judicata
(JG)(VVP), 2008 WL 5958061 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2008) (granting defendants’ motion to
dismiss on forum non conveniens and international comity grounds for European law claims
in an antitrust action brought by largely foreign plaintiffs, against largely foreign defendants,
arising out of events occurring abroad).
124
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). The rule states that “[t]he matters pertinent to these findings
include:
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
begun by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in
the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
Id. With global classes, factors (C) and (D) are the most pertinent to the analysis.
125
At least one Canadian court has also considered the res judicata issue in the context of
certifying global class proceedings. In Ramdath v. George Brown College, the Superior
Court of Justice was faced with the question of whether to certify a class action in Ontario
where 65% of the class members were foreign. [2010] O.J. No. 1411 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)
(Can.). Defendants argued that the court should not certify the class because any proposed
judgment or settlement would not be entitled to preclusive effect in the countries where the
foreign class members reside. In particular, evidence was adduced that courts in India and
China (the countries with the largest number of class members) would refuse to recognize a
Canadian class judgment. Rather than regard the evidence as relevant to the certification
issue, the court appeared offended at the idea that a foreign court would refuse to accord res
judicata effect to a Canadian class judgment:
Nor do I accept the proposition that the court should not exercise jurisdiction over
non-resident class members where there is evidence that a particular foreign
jurisdiction might not recognize a class action judgment either altogether (as is
said to be the case in China) or in the absence of actual notice (as is said to be the
case in India). The hypothetical failure of another state to observe the generally
accepted principles of private international law in connection with the assumption
of jurisdiction and the recognition of foreign judgments should not preclude an
Ontario court from taking jurisdiction in a class action involving its residents . . . .
Id. at para. 72. Ultimately, the res judicata issue probably did not matter a great deal in the
Ramdath case itself. As the court correctly pointed out, it is unlikely that an Indian or a
Chinese court would even take jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim given the factual
connection between the claim and Ontario: “If an Indian court would not accept jurisdiction,
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analysis conducted by U.S. courts are emerging in the academic
literature.126 The goal here is not to endorse a U.S.-style res judicata
analysis as a predicate to the certification of global classes in Canada.127
Rather, the objective is to underscore that awareness of the implications of
the res judicata issues at play is pivotal to crafting class actions that are
substantively fair to both plaintiffs and defendants.128
In the Imax case, the Ontario court certified a global class of plaintiffs,
of whom the overwhelming majority (85–90%) were foreign. If Imax were
to settle the litigation in Ontario, the most it could be assured would be that
10–15% of all potential claims were resolved.129 Such a settlement would
be nonsensical from the vantage point of Imax; it would pay to settle 100%
of claims, but would only be granted assurances that 10–15% of claims
were settled.130 Whether the foreign claims are, in fact, resolved will turn
on whether a court in the U.S. would grant an Ontario class judgment res
judicata effect. In other words, the success of a global class turns on

then it matters not whether India would recognize the binding effect of an Ontario judgment
on an Indian class member.” Id. at para. 73. The claim in Ramdath (negligent
misrepresentation in connection with an Ontario college’s promotional materials) is likely
one which could only be asserted in Ontario. In other cases, the dispute will be more
“global” such that multiple forums could (and would) assert jurisdiction over the defendant.
In this case, the res judicata issue will be important.
126
See Matthew Jasilli, A Rat Res? Questioning the Value of Res Judicata In Rule
23(B)(3) Superiority Inquiries for Foreign Cubed Class Action Securities Litigations, 48
COLUM J. TRANSNAT’L L. 114, 129 (2009); Tanya Monestier, Transnational Class Actions
and the Illusory Search for Res Judicata, 86 TULANE L. REV. 1 (2011) [hereinafter
Monestier, Transnational Class Actions]; Michael P. Murtagh, The Rule 23(B)(3)
Superiority Requirement and Transnational Class Actions: Excluding Foreign Class
Members in Favor of European Remedies, 34 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2011);
Linda Sandstrom Simard & Jay Tidmarsh, Foreign Citizens and Transnational Class
Actions, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 87 (2012); Wasserman, supra note 121, at 379.
127
In fact, I argue strenuously against such a res judicata analysis in Transnational Class
Actions and the Illusory Search for Res Judicata. See Monestier, Transnational Class
Actions, supra note 126. In particular, I argue that the litigation and structural dynamics of
class litigation combine to render the res judicata effect of a U.S. class judgment inherently
unknowable to a U.S. court ex ante. See id.
128
Brown, supra note 115, at 235 (“Canadian courts should be slow to certify worldwide
classes. Jurisdiction should take into account recognition. Purporting to assume jurisdiction
over proposed foreign class members, without considering whether the resulting judgment
will be recognized for the benefit of, or against, a foreign class member outside of Canada
will lead to uncertainty and conflicting decisions.”). I agree that broadly speaking,
jurisdiction should take into account recognition—though I disagree that an involved res
judicata analysis is the way to accomplish this.
129
Here, I am assuming that the settlement in Ontario would proceed without any
cooperation or coordination of proceedings in the United States. In other words, I am
assuming that there would be an Ontario judgment rendered without the “blessing” of a court
in the United States.
130
Presumably, Imax would take this factor into account in its settlement calculus.
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whether courts outside the forum would recognize the Canadian judgment
as binding on its residents. Notably, U.S. courts have never had occasion to
consider whether, or under what circumstances, foreign class judgments are
binding on absent U.S. class members. Likewise, jurisprudence concerning
the preclusive effect of foreign class judgments in countries outside the U.S.
is virtually non-existent.131 In fact, the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision
in Currie is the only sustained judicial discussion concerning the
enforceability of foreign class judgments against absent class members.132
Given that Canadian courts have no way of knowing what the fate of a
global class judgment or settlement will be outside of Canada, it appears
senseless to include foreign claimants in a global class. First, the presence
of foreign claimants (particularly when such claimants comprise the
overwhelming majority of the class) skews the settlement and litigation
dynamics of the class action. Second, the inclusion of foreign claimants

131
See Brown, supra note 115, at 230 (“There are not, as far as this author is aware, any
reported decisions dealing with the enforcement of a Canadian class action judgment in a
foreign jurisdiction.”). For foreign jurisprudence on the enforceability of U.S. class
judgments, see Stichting Onderzoek Bedrijfs Informatie Sobi/Deloitte Accountants B.V.,
[Amsterdam District Court], 23 June 2010, No. 398833/HA ZA 08-1465, para. 6.5.6 (Neth.),
where the Dutch court recognized a U.S. class judgment in the Ahold securities fraud case
and barred any Dutch class members who did not opt out from bringing a subsequent action.
The court recognized the U.S. judgment for three reasons: (1) the U.S. District Court
entering the class judgment had an “internationally accepted basis” for jurisdiction over the
matter; (2) the U.S. proceedings satisfied the requirements of Dutch due process; and (3) the
class judgment “survive[d] the test against Dutch public order[.]” Id. at paras. 6.5.1–6.5.5;
see also Campos v. Kentucky & Indiana Terminal Railroad Co., 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 459, 473
(1962), where an English court expressed uneasiness with the notion that an absent member
of a U.S. class action could be bound by a class action judgment:

[T]here is great force in [the] contention that in accordance with English private
international law a foreign judgment could not give rise to a plea of res judicata in
the English Courts unless the party alleged to be bound had been served with the
process that led to the foreign judgment.
Id.
132
Although there is very little case law on point, there is some academic commentary on
the res judicata effect of U.S. class judgments in foreign countries. See John C.L. Dixon,
The “Res Judicata” Effect in England of a US Class Action Settlement, 46 INT’L & COMP. L.
Q. 134 (1997); Richard H. Dreyfuss, Class Action Judgment Enforcement in Italy:
Procedural “Due Process” Requirements, 10 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 5 (2002); Jonathan
Harris, The Recognition and Enforcement of US Class Action Judgments in England,
CONTRATTO E IMPRESA 617 (2006); Marina Matousekova, Would French Courts Enforce
U.S. Class Action Judgments?, CONTRATTO E IMPRESA 651 (2006); Rachael Mulheron, The
Recognition, and Res Judicata Effect, of a United States Class Actions Judgment in England:
A Rebuttal of Vivendi, 75 MODERN L. REV. 180 (2012); Andrea Pinna, Recognition and Res
Judicata of US Class Action Judgments in European Legal Systems, 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 31,
39 (2008); Mark Stiggelbout, The Recognition in England and Wales of United States
Judgments in Class Actions, 52 HARV. INT’L L. J. 433, 435 (2011).
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increases the cost and complexity of the action without even a modicum of
assurance that any eventual judgment or settlement will be binding.
One solution that has been proposed in the United States as a response
to the res judicata concerns that plague global class actions is the creation of
an opt-in mechanism for foreign claimants.133 Under an opt-in regime, a
class member affirmatively chooses to be part of the class proceedings or
settlement through the act of “opting-in.” Thus, unlike an opt-out regime,
an opt-in regime relies on the foreign class members’ active consent for its
legitimacy. An opt-in mechanism for foreign claimants avoids the difficult
res judicata problems associated with the recognition of foreign class
judgments. This is because a foreign claimant who has consented to the
jurisdiction of the forum through the act of opting-in cannot later challenge
the authority of the court to render judgment against him. Most foreign
jurisdictions would regard the foreign claimant’s consent to the class
proceedings abroad as sufficient to preclude any subsequent action by him
in the courts of his home country.134
The American Law Institute (ALI), in its latest draft of the Principles
of Aggregate Litigation, recognizes that foreign claimants may warrant
differential treatment under domestic class proceedings legislation. 135 As
such, the ALI proposes a discretionary opt-in mechanism for foreign
claimants under section 2.10:
Aggregation by Consent. When justice so requires, a court may
authorize aggregate treatment of related claims or of a common issue
by affirmative consent of each affected claimant.136

The Comment to section 2.10 recognizes that the section is intended to
create, “in the parlance of class action law, an ‘opt-in’ proceeding” in
certain “exceptional” circumstances.137 The Comment further notes that
such an exceptional situation might arise “when litigation takes place in the
United States but primarily involves claimants located in foreign
countries.”138
A template for the creation of a hybrid regime can be found in British
Columbia’s class proceedings legislation.139 Under the Class Proceedings
133

See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, U.S. Class Actions Go Global: Transnational Class
Actions and Personal Jurisdiction, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 41, 85 (2003); Monestier,
Transnational Class Actions, supra note 126, at 46.
134
In an exceptional case, a plaintiff might still be able to argue that the class
proceedings to which he consented nonetheless violated natural justice or public policy.
135
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.10 (2010).
136
Id.
137
Id. at cmt. a.
138
Id.
139
Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50, s.4 (Can.) (B.C. Act). Note that
Newfoundland and New Brunswick also have hybrid opt-in/opt-out regimes. See Class
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Act, residents of British Columbia are subject to an opt-out regime, while
non-residents are subject to an opt-in regime. Section 16(2) of the B.C. Act
provides, “a person who is not a resident of British Columbia may . . . opt
in to that class proceeding if the person would be, but for not being a
resident of British Columbia, a member of the class involved in the class
proceeding.”140 Thus, the B.C. Act distinguishes between “resident” and
“non-resident” class members, requiring the latter to take steps to opt-into
the litigation in order to be bound to judgment. This hybrid regime can
easily be applied to global class actions, so as to require foreign claimants
to affirmatively opt-into the Canadian proceedings. This would go a long
way toward alleviating some of the res judicata problems posed by the
existence of global class actions.141
Justice Corbett in Imax recognized the desirability of allowing foreign
claimants to participate in Canadian class proceedings, without mandating
that they do so:
It would be wrong, of course, to compel foreign investors to be
bound by Canadian proceedings if they prefer to have their claims
adjudicated elsewhere. But similarly, it would be wrong to preclude
them from participating in Canadian proceedings if they wish their
claims to be pursued in Ontario.142

Justice Corbett’s endorsement of a global opt-out class fails to
appreciate that, in essence, the Ontario court is “compel[ling] foreign
investors to be bound by Canadian proceedings” rather than letting them
“participat[e] in Canadian proceedings if they [so] wish.”143 This is because
an opt-out global class presumptively includes foreign claimants in the class
and places the onus on the class members to remove themselves. It is wellestablished as an empirical matter that very few claimants actually opt-out
of class actions. In a study of class action data from four geographical
districts in the U.S., Professor Willging found that the median percentage of
members who opted out of a settlement was either 0.1% or 0.2% of the total

Proceedings Act, S.N.B. 2006, c. C-5.15 (Can.); Class Actions Act, S.N.L. 2001, c. C-18.1
(Can.).
140
Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50, s.4 (Can.).
141
There are certainly critiques that may be directed at opt-in regimes. See, e.g., Samuel
Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come To Europe?, 62 VAND. L.
REV. 179, 206 (2009) (“But opt-in procedures also pose problems [including] problems with
incentivizing a named plaintiff under an opt-in regime, difficulties in attracting adequate
participation rates, and the challenge of offering defendants the opportunity to achieve global
peace through the class procedure.”).
142
Silver v. Imax Corp., 2011 ONSC 103, para. 62 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (Leave to
Appeal Decision).
143
Id.
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membership of the class.144 Moreover, in three quarters of cases, only 1.2%
of class members or fewer opted out of the settlement.145 This demonstrates
that the practical effect of certifying a global opt-out class is that foreign
claimants are bound by Canadian proceedings—at least from the
perspective of a Canadian court.146 If the goal is to allow foreign claimants
to participate in Canadian proceedings “if they wish,” then clearly an opt-in
class action more effectively achieves that objective.
The purpose of this section was to illustrate the role that the
recognition of a class judgment plays (or should play) in the global
certification calculus. Unfortunately, the Imax court, while cognizant of the
“front-end” jurisdictional and other issues, was not as concerned with the
far more important “back-end” issues.147
Without a meaningful
appreciation of the “back-end” issues, the global class action in Canada is
balanced on a very precarious fulcrum.
C. Choice of Law
In addition to the problems of jurisdiction and recognition, global
classes also present serious choice of law issues.148 Justice van Rensburg
144

THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS
ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON CIVIL RULES 10 (1996); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of
Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1532 (2004) (finding that “on average, less than 1 percent of class
members opt-out” of class settlements). On why so few class members choose to opt out,
one author observes:
One reason for this may be the lack of a better alternative for litigating claims.
There is little incentive for a claimant to opt out of a class action lawsuit when the
claimant’s damages are too small to justify an independent suit. Another potential
explanation is human psychology. Research suggests that people are much more
likely to consent to a procedure when consent is measured passively, by failure to
file an objection, rather than actively, by explicitly registering agreement to
participate. This lack of incentive to opt out is increased by the fact that absent
class members have no responsibilities while the action is pending, so the burdens
of remaining in the lawsuit are relatively low.
Ilana T. Buschkin, Note, The Viability of Class Actions in a Globalized Economy –
Permitting Foreign Claimants to be Members of Class Action Lawsuits in the U.S. Federal
Courts, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1563, 1575 (2005) (citations omitted).
145
WILLGING, supra note 144, at 10.
146
As discussed, whether such claimants are, in fact, bound will turn on whether a
foreign court recognizes and grants res judicata effect to the Canadian judgment.
147
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 115, at 226 (“Failing to take into account whether an
Ontario judgment would be recognized by a court in a foreign class member’s country
ignores a fundamental aspect of jurisdiction. Unfortunately, this is not an uncommon
approach by courts when dealing with potential foreign class members.”).
148
On the choice of law issues in securities litigation from a European perspective, see
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identified the plethora of choice of law concerns raised by the certification
of a global class in Imax:
[I]s the statutory cause of action restricted to Ontario
shareholders? Does it apply to non-resident shareholders who
purchased their shares on the TSX? Does it apply to Ontario
shareholders who purchased their shares on NASDAQ? As for the
common law claims, what law would apply to the misrepresentation
claims of class members residing outside of Ontario, or
Canada? Would this depend on where they purchased their shares,
reside or suffered damages? What particular defences would the
defendants rely upon that would not be available to them under
Ontario law? Are there in fact substantial differences between the
common law principles and defences applicable in the other
jurisdictions?149

Although Justice van Rensburg in Imax was aware of the choice of law
hurdles in certifying a global class, she concluded that although “[t]he
prospect that the claims of nonresident class members may be subject to
different laws adds complexity to the litigation . . . [it] does not weigh
against certification.”150 She added that a court could deal with any choice
of law issues that arise by “adjusting the common issues or recognizing
subclasses as appropriate.”151 With respect, this view fails to account for
the fact that the choice of law issues bear not only on the manageability of
the litigation but also on the proper geographical scope of the class.
The parties in Imax apparently believed that the statutory cause of
action for misrepresentation under the OSA was available to resident, nonresident and foreign claimants alike, and thus focused their submissions on
the choice of law complexities posed by the certification of the common
law misrepresentation claims.152 However, it is far from clear that the cause
of action under the OSA is available to foreign claimants. In Canada, no
court has had occasion to consider the availability of a cause of action for
misrepresentation in the secondary market under provincial securities
statutes to foreign claimants and, in particular, to foreign claimants who
purchased shares of the defendant corporation on a foreign exchange.
However, based on the tenor of current case law, it would appear that a
statutory cause of action under the OSA would be available only to
Wolf-Georg Ring & Alexander Hellgardt, The International Dimension of Issuer Liability
and Choice of Law from a Transatlantic Perspective, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 23
(2011); see also Emmanuel Gaillard, After Morrison: The Case for a New Hague Convention
on the Law Applicable to Securities Frauds, 5 DISPUTE RESOLUTION INT’L 35 (2011).
149
Silver v. Imax Corp., (2009) 86 C.P.C. 6th 273, para. 154 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)
(Certification Decision).
150
Id. at para. 164.
151
Id.
152
Id. at paras. 136, 146.
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investors who traded on the TSX. Authority for this view can be found in
the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s decision in Pearson v. Boliden,153
an action brought under British Columbia’s Securities Act (“B.C. Securities
Act”)154 for alleged misrepresentations contained in a prospectus filed in
connection with a distribution of shares made across Canada. Although
Pearson dealt with an action for primary market misrepresentation, its
reasoning would seem to apply equally to an action for secondary market
misrepresentation under provincial securities statutes.
The British
Columbia Court of Appeal found that the B.C. Securities Act did not
provide a cause of action to those class members who purchased their
shares pursuant to a distribution outside of British Columbia. It articulated
the relevant choice of law rule as follows:
But in respect of a misrepresentation contained in a prospectus
circulated in a province and deemed to be relied on by a person in
purchasing securities offered thereby, a court would in making a
choice of law be bound to follow the constitutional principle that it is
the province in whose territory the securities are distributed which
has the jurisdiction (in the constitutional sense) to regulate the
manner in which the distribution is carried out and to attach civil
consequences to non-compliance.155

Thus, while the B.C. Securities Act could govern the statutory claims
of British Columbia purchasers of the defendant’s shares, it could not
govern the claims of non-British Columbia purchasers.156 Those class
members who purchased their shares outside of British Columbia would be
subject to the securities legislation of those jurisdictions in which they
purchased their shares. The court observed that this result comported with
the reasonable expectations of investors; that is, an investor would
anticipate when he purchased shares under a distribution taking place in a
certain province that the securities legislation of that province would govern
the obligations of the parties.157
A similar result was reached in the recent case of Coulson v. Citigroup
Global Markets Inc.158 In Coulson, the plaintiff asserted a cause of action
under section 130 of the OSA on behalf of a national class of shareholders.

153

2002 BCCA 624, (2002) 7 B.C.L.R. 4th 245 (Can.).
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418 (Can.).
155
Pearson v. Boliden, 7 2002 BCCA 624, (2002) 7 B.C.L.R. 4th 245, para. 65 (Can.)
(emphasis added).
156
The court was careful to point out that “British Columbia purchasers” referred to
persons who acquired their shares as a result of a “distribution” in British Columbia,
regardless of their place of residence. Thus, “British Columbia purchasers” may not be
exactly co-extensive with the class of persons who reside in the province. See id. at para. 48.
157
See id. at para. 66.
158
2010 ONSC 1596 (Can.).
154
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The defendants resisted certification, in part on the basis that the statutory
cause of action under the OSA was not available to non-resident class
members. The Superior Court of Justice agreed:
The Defendants’ objection is that [the plaintiff] in his proposed
definition of class membership has characterized all Canadian
purchasers of [defendant’s] common shares as purchasers who have
remedies under s.130 of the Ontario Securities Act. However, only
some of the Canadian purchasers of [defendant’s] shares have
remedies under s.130, while others may have had remedies under
another province’s comparable legislation and other Canadian
purchasers of [defendant’s] shares might have had no entitlements
under any provincial legislation. The legislature of the Province of
Ontario does not have the constitutional authority to regulate
securities transactions that take place outside of Ontario, . . . [I]n the
absence of the parties agreeing to be bound by Ontario law, Ontario
does not have the jurisdiction to make Ontario law apply
extraterritorially.159

The court accepted the defendant’s proposed definition of the class,
which was to include all purchasers who acquired common shares of the
defendant corporation “as a result of a distribution in Ontario within the
meaning of the Ontario Securities Act.”160 In practical terms, this class
definition would have the effect of excluding those class members who
purchased their shares pursuant to a distribution under another provincial
securities regime.
The court in Imax did not engage with the pivotal question of whether
the OSA provided a statutory cause of action to class claimants in respect of
purchases that did not occur in Ontario.161 This is probably owing to the
defendant’s concession that the statutory remedy under the OSA would be
available to all aggrieved purchasers, and not simply to those class
members who purchased their shares in Ontario. However, the question of
whether or not claimants who purchased their shares on the NASDAQ have
a statutory cause of action is a critical one, and one which has (or at least
should have) a significant impact on the certification equation.162
159

Id. at para. 145.
Id. at para. 136.
161
It is likely, following the reasoning in Pearson and Coulson, that a court would find
that a non-resident or foreign class member did have a cause of action in respect of
purchases that took place on the TSX. Note that under the Morrison decision in the United
States, foreign claimants still have a cause of action under federal securities laws provided
that the transactional test is satisfied—i.e. such class members purchased or sold shares on a
U.S. exchange.
162
Again, the objective here is not to provide an answer to the question of whether
foreign claimants have a cause of action under Ontario’s securities legislation but to
highlight the importance of the answer to that question in the global class certification
160
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If those plaintiffs who purchased shares of Imax on the NASDAQ are
unable to assert a statutory claim for misrepresentation under Ontario law, it
is doubtful that they will be able to assert statutory claims under foreign
securities laws—which, in turn, means that they lack a claim altogether.
Normally, a Canadian court will apply foreign law in domestic proceedings
provided that such foreign law is adequately pleaded and proven.163 So, for
instance, an Ontario court might apply New York’s common law of fraud to
the tort claims of New York class members. However, there is a notable
limitation on the application of foreign law: Canadian courts will not apply
foreign public law in domestic proceedings.164 The limitation is a
longstanding one in private international law and stems from the notion that
since a Canadian court will not enforce a public law judgment, neither
should it purport to adjudicate a claim arising under the public laws of
another country.165 It is arguable that foreign securities laws fall within the
purview of public law claims that Canadian courts will not entertain.
Silberman suggests that “a private cause of action for securities fraud [may
be] so intertwined with the public regulatory regime that it cannot be
separated out, and thus the public law taboo is justified.”166 In fact,
following the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Morrison, foreign
shareholders in In re Toyota Motor Corporation Securities Litigation167
who had been foreclosed from asserting claims under U.S. securities laws
attempted to argue that a U.S. court should apply Japanese securities law to
the claims of foreign shareholders.168 The district court of California
declined to apply Japanese securities law in an American action.169 While
decision.
163
See Caglar v. Moore, [2005] O.J. No. 4606, para. 15 (Can.) (“The approach of the
courts to foreign law is well established. The existence of foreign law is treated as a fact and
the party seeking to rely upon it must both plead it and prove it. If the foreign law is not
pleaded or not properly proven, the court will apply the lex fori as ‘it is the only law
available.’”).
164
JANET WALKER & JEAN-GABRIEL CASTEL, CANADIAN CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8.5, (6th
ed. 2005) (“Canadian courts generally refuse to give effect to foreign laws that assert
sovereign power, such as antitrust or regulation of competition law, securities legislation . . .
.”).
165
For a history and critique of the rule, see William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law
Taboo, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 161 (2002).
166
Silberman, supra note 1, at 13.
167
No. CV 10-922 DSF (AJWx), 2011 WL 2675395 (C.D. Cal. Filed Oct. 4, 2010).
168
Justice Ginsberg raised this possibility in oral argument in Morrison. See Transcript
of Oral Argument at 7–8, Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010)
(No. 08-1191), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/08-1191.pdf (“I mean, this case is Australian plaintiff, Australian defendant, shares
purchased in Australia. It has ‘Australia’ written all over it. . . . And taking that, why not – of the
applicable laws to this transaction, to this alleged fraud, isn’t the most appropriate choice the law
of Australia rather than the law of the United States?”).
169
Toyota Motor Corp., 2011 WL 2675395, at *6–7.
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the court did not refuse to apply Japanese law strictly on the basis that it
represented “foreign public law,” the court was sensitive to the comity
concerns170 presented by the potential application of foreign law in this
context.171
If the statutory remedy under the OSA is not available to the class
members in Imax who purchased their shares on a foreign exchange, this
leaves a very small percentage of claimants (10–15%) who can actually
assert an OSA claim. That 85–90% of the class has been foreclosed from
pursing the statutory remedy, and is instead relegated to common law
claims, undoubtedly has an impact on the settlement value of the class
action. The absence of a statutory OSA remedy for claimants who
purchased shares on a foreign exchange (coupled with the complexity of the
choice of law analysis for the common law claims) strongly militates
against certification of a global class.
Rather than focusing on the statutory cause of action, the court in Imax
emphasized the choice of law concerns posed by the common law
misrepresentation claims. The court noted that the issue is governed by the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Tolofson v. Jensen,172 where the
Court endorsed a fairly strict lex loci delicti test for choice of law in tort.173
The issue in Imax, as in many complex tort cases, is locating exactly where
the tort occurred: Did the tort occur where the defendant made the
misrepresentation?
Or, did the tort occur instead where the
misrepresentation was relied upon and harm was suffered? The court in
Imax did not engage with this difficult question. Rather, it observed that
“[i]t is not obvious . . . that the applicable law will be that of the place

170
Id. at *7 (“The exceptional circumstance of comity to the Japanese courts also
strongly argues against the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. The clear underlying
rationale of the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison is that foreign governments have the
right to decide how to regulate their own securities markets. This respect for foreign law
would be completely subverted if foreign claims were allowed to be piggybacked into
virtually every American securities fraud case, imposing American procedures,
requirements, and interpretations likely never contemplated by the drafters of the foreign
law. While there may be instances where it is appropriate to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over foreign securities fraud claims, any reasonable reading of Morrison
suggests that those instances will be rare.”)(citations omitted).
171
The court also expressed concerns about manageability. See id. at *6 (“The Japanese
law claims substantially predominate over the American law claims. The vast majority of
the members of the currently pleaded class are common stock holders who purchased their
stock on foreign exchanges and, therefore, have only a Japanese law claim. It follows that
the damages analysis would focus overwhelmingly on these claims. In addition, even the
few aspects of the claims that are admitted by both sides to differ from the American law
claims are extraordinarily significant in the context of this particular litigation. Under these
circumstances, the Japanese law claims unquestionably would dominate the litigation.”).
172
[1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022 (Can.).
173
Lex loci deliciti refers to the law of the place where the tort occurred.
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where each individual class member sustained damage.”174 It further noted
that even if the laws of different jurisdictions were to apply to the common
law claims, it was not clear that the applicable common law principles and
defenses would vary from place to place, such that a court would need to
deal with the potential application of multiple laws. Tellingly, the Imax
court referred to class actions such as Cloud v. Canada (Attorney
General),175 Rumley v. British Columbia176 and Nantais v. Teletronics
Proprietary (Canada) Ltd.177 where courts found that choice of law issues
were not a bar to the certification of a national classes—all of which
considered the potential applicability of the laws of another Canadian
province but not the multiple laws of a foreign country.
The Imax court was likely too hasty in dismissing the choice of law
objections as “premature.”178 The choice of law issue, both in terms of the
statutory and common law causes of action, is intrinsically intertwined with
the propriety of certifying a global class under section 5 of the Class
Proceedings Act. In particular, where the statutory remedy under the OSA
is not available to the overwhelming majority of the class and the remaining
claims are subject to the differing laws of potentially sixty different
jurisdictions,179 it is doubtful that a class proceeding in Ontario would be
“the preferable procedure” for the resolution of the common issues.180
Moreover, where the laws of so many jurisdictions are involved, it would
be difficult for the representative plaintiff to set out under section 5(e)(2) of
174
Silver v. Imax Corp., (2009) 86 C.P.C. 6th 273, para. 152 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)
(Certification Decision). The court proceeded to note that “[s]uch an approach would ignore
the fact that a class proceeding is an aggregate action and not a collection of individual
claims.” Id. It is not clear that Canadian courts generally subscribe to this view. The
Supreme Court of Canada has recently emphasized that “the class action, while having an
important social dimension, is only a ‘procedural vehicle whose use neither modifies nor
creates substantive rights.’” Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, 2007 SCC
34, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801, para. 226 (Can.). This statement appears to be more consistent with
the view that the class action is in fact a “collection of individual claims” rather than an
“aggregate action.”
175
(2004) 73 O.R. 3d 401 (C.A.), leave to appeal to the S.C.C. refused, [2005] S.C.C.A.
No. 50 (Can.).
176
2001 SCC 69, [2001], 3 S.C.R. 184 (Can.).
177
(1995), 25 O.R. 3d 331 (Can. Gen. Div.).
178
Silver v. Imax Corp., (2009) 86 C.P.C. 6th 273, para. 153 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)
(Certification Decision).
179
I have assumed that there are claimants in all Canadian provinces and all American
states. Note that in the American context, choice of law issues often prove insurmountable
in certifying class actions. See, e.g., Genevieve G. York-Erwin, Note, The Choice-of Law
Problem(s) in the Class Action Context, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1793, 1794 (2009) (“Choice of
law has proven to be one of the most consistent obstacles to damage class certification in
recent years. Federal precedent has developed such that when multiple state laws would
apply to a class, federal judges usually deny certification.”).
180
See Province of Ontario Class Proceedings Act, R.S.O. 1992, c. 6, §5 (Can.).
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the Ontario Class Proceedings Act a “workable method of advancing the
proceeding on behalf of the class”181 Clearly, a proceeding that involved
the application of laws from ten different provinces and fifty different states
would present serious manageability issues which would be difficult to
overcome.182 This would still be true even if a Canadian court were to
somehow craft sub-classes that corresponded to groups of different laws.
The Imax court failed to grasp that choice of law concerns should not
be downgraded to a secondary consideration, only to be dealt with postcertification. At that point, the certification decision is a “done deal”—one
which frames the defendant’s assessment of risk and the plaintiff’s view of
the prospect of litigation success.183 Thus, deferring the hard questions until
some point post-certification skews both the litigation and settlement
dynamics. Sorting out the choice of law issues is not merely an academic
exercise, but rather one which must logically precede the section 5
certification inquiry.
D. Parallel Class Proceedings
An additional source of complexity in the Imax case arose from the
fact that a parallel class proceeding had been filed against Imax in the
United States. The defendant in the Ontario Imax proceedings had argued
that given the existence of a competing class action in New York, it “would
be better to certify the Canadian class only, with leave to the plaintiffs to
return to the court, depending on what may occur in the U.S.
Proceedings.”184 Justice van Rensburg paid short shrift to this argument,
pointing to the defendant’s contradictory assertions in the U.S. proceedings.
In the United States, Imax attempted to defeat certification by arguing that
it would be preferable to litigate the issues in dispute in the pending Ontario

181

Id. at §5(e).
One author notes that “[a]ctions with a transnational reach may, in fact, undermine the
judicial efficiency being sought by certifying as a transnational class.” Joel Rochon, The
Transnational Class: A Canadian Perspective on Cross-Border Class Actions, 1 ATLA
ANN. CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS ¶ 453 (2006).
183
There is, of course, the possibility that the court will decertify the class or part thereof.
However, in reality, the possibility of decertification is largely illusory. See Larry Kramer,
Class Actions and Jurisdictional Boundaries: Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 565 (1996) (“The stated premise of provisional certification is that the
court can always decertify later if the choice-of-law issues complicate matters too much.
But later never comes, and never will, because the cases always settle first—as judges know
better than anyone. The provisional certification ploy thus enables the court to create a class
without letting pesky choice-of-law problems get in the way. The applicable law is left
undecided—though the fact that a class has been certified, together with the threat that one
law may be applied and uncertainty as to what the law will be, undoubtedly plays and
important role in settlement.”).
184
Silver v. Imax Corp., (2009) 86 C.P.C. 6th 273, para. 111 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)
(Certification Decision).
182
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proceedings.185 Notably, Imax asserted, “only the Canadian court is in a
position to grant full relief to all purchasers of IMAX stock.”186 The
Ontario court found the defendant’s about-face “revealing,” observing that
the inconsistency in the defendant’s submissions in the two proceedings
suggested that its opposition to class certification in Ontario was not based
on bona fide concerns about the propriety of adjudicating the claims of a
worldwide class, but rather was an attempt to limit potential damages
exposure.187
Justice van Rensburg thus concluded that a pending
application for certification in another jurisdiction was not a barrier to the
certification of a global class in Ontario.188
After Justice van Rensburg rendered her decision in Imax, the
Southern District of New York in In re IMAX Securities Litigation
considered whether to certify a class of Imax shareholders who purchased
their shares on the NASDAQ.189 While the court held that most of Rule
23’s requirements were satisfied, it found the proposed class representative
inadequate and thus denied the motion for class certification.190 In its
decision, the court addressed the propriety of certifying a class proceeding
in a U.S. district court when a parallel proceeding was underway in Canada.
The court noted that the proceedings in Ontario were not a bar to class
certification in the United States because, inter alia, an additional defendant
was named in the U.S. action, the complaint in the United States alleged a
longer class period, the class as defined included only shareholders who
purchased Imax stock on the NASDAQ, and the Ontario decision was under
185

See In re IMAX Sec. Litig., 272 F.R.D. 138, 158–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Silver v. Imax Corp., (2009) 86 C.P.C. 6th 273, para. 114 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)
(Certification Decision). The court noted the logical consequence of Imax’s argument: “If
IMAX is successful in the position in the U.S. proceedings, the U.S. court may decide not to
certify a global class or may decline certification altogether on the basis that a more effective
remedy is available to the class in the Ontario proceedings.” Id. at para. 116.
187
Id.
188
Id. at para. 133.
189
In re IMAX, 272 F.R.D. at 146–60.
190
In In re Imax Securities Litigation, No. 06 Civ. 6128(NRB), 2011 WL 1487090
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2011), the U.S. District Court approved the plaintiff’s motion to appoint
a new class representative and new class counsel. On January 26, 2012, the parties to the
United States Imax proceeding entered into a Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement. The
proposed settlement involved a payment of $12 million in cash to resolve the U.S. class
members’ claims. See Abbey Spanier Rodd & Abrams, LLP Announces Proposed Settlement
in Imax Corp. Securities Class Action Litigation, ABBEY SPANIER RODD & ABRAMS, LLP,
http://www.abbeyspanier.com/press-releases/400-settlement-between-settlement-classmembers-and-imax-corporation (last accessed Mar. 30, 2012). An order preliminarily
approving the final settlement and providing for notice was signed by Judge Buchwald in the
U.S. proceedings on January 31, 2012. The order preliminarily certifies a class for
settlement purposes only and preliminarily approves the settlement as “fair, just, reasonable
and adequate as to the settlement class members, and in the best interests of the class, subject
to notice to the settlement class and further consideration at a fairness hearing.” Silver v.
Imax, 2012 ONSC 1047, para. 26.
186
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appeal. Fundamentally, though, the New York district court was of the
view that a parallel class action in a foreign jurisdiction that purported to
resolve the claims of U.S. residents was not “superior” within the meaning
of Rule 23:
At bottom, a class action in a foreign jurisdiction, applying that
jurisdiction’s securities laws, to which a named defendant in the
United States action is not a party, in which the first complaint in the
foreign jurisdiction was filed after the first complaint in this case, is
not a ‘superior’ way of adjudicating plaintiffs’ claims against that
party for alleged violations of U.S. securities laws . . . 191

Approximately two months after the Southern District of New York
released its decision, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice refused leave to
appeal Justice van Rensburg’s certification order, thereby permitting the
Imax litigation in Ontario to proceed as a global class action. Justice
Corbett agreed with Justice van Rensburg that the defendants’ submissions
concerning parallel proceedings were “significantly undermined” by their
opposition to class certification in the United States.192 Surprisingly,
though, Justice Corbett’s reasons made no mention of the December 2010
decision in In re IMAX Securities Litigation. In fact, Justice Corbett
appears to take a rather sanguine view of the parallel proceedings in the
U.S., remarking that the proceedings should be viewed as “complementary”
and not “competing.”193
In asserting jurisdiction over the claims of foreign class members, the
Imax court did not adequately account for the existence of overlapping class
proceedings in the United States. The law governing parallel proceedings
in traditional two-party litigation is well established in Canada. Generally,
a defendant will move under the doctrine of forum non conveniens to stay
the forum proceedings in favor of proceedings in another jurisdiction. A
court will grant the stay provided the defendant can establish that there is
“another forum that is clearly more appropriate” than the domestic forum for
the resolution of the action.194 Factors relevant to this determination include:
the comparative convenience and expense for the parties to the proceeding
191

In re IMAX, 272 F.R.D. at 159.
Silver v. Imax Corp., 2011 ONSC 103, para. 57 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (Leave to
Appeal Decision).
193
Id. at para. 65 (“Perhaps the lawyers view the proceedings as ‘competing.’ The courts
do not. The proceedings are and should be complementary, to achieve a proper vindication
of the rights of plaintiffs, fair process for the defendants and plaintiffs, respect for the
autonomous jurisdictions involved, and an integrated and efficient resolution of claims. This
requires common sense, judicial comity, and fair process. It does not require balkanization
of class proceedings, but rather sensitive integration of them.”).
194
Amchem Prod. Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers’ Comp. Bd.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897
(Can.).
192
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and for their witnesses in litigating in the court or in any alternative forum;
the law to be applied to issues in the proceeding; the desirability of avoiding
a multiplicity of legal proceedings; the desirability of avoiding conflicting
decisions in different courts; the enforcement of an eventual judgment; and
the fair and efficient working of the Canadian legal system as a whole.195
The forum non conveniens analysis is rendered significantly more
complicated in the class context, in which a court is deciding whether to
stay an action on the basis that a parallel class proceeding has been filed
and/or certified in another jurisdiction. A classic example of this forum non
conveniens “battle” can be found in the recent decisions of the Ontario and
Saskatchewan courts in the Vioxx litigation.196 In Vioxx, courts in Ontario
and Saskatchewan certified overlapping classes of plaintiffs who had
ingested the defendant pharmaceutical company’s drug, Vioxx. The
Ontario court (the second to certify a multi-jurisdictional class action)
refused to stay its proceedings in favor of those commenced in
Saskatchewan. On appeal, the Ontario court noted that although the
existence of two parallel multi-jurisdictional class proceedings added
“another layer of complication to already complex litigation,” the problems
were “not insurmountable.”197 Ultimately, the issue was “resolved” when
the Saskatchewan court decertified the class proceeding in that
jurisdiction.198
195

These are the factors codified in section 11 of the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings
Transfer Act (CJTPA). In Teck Cominco Metals Ltd. v. Lloyd’s Underwriters, the Supreme
Court of Canada noted that “Section 11 of the CJPTA was intended to codify the forum non
conveniens test . . .” [2009] 1 S.C.R. 321, para. 22 (Can.). For other iterations of the test, see
Spar Aerospace Ltd. v. American Mobile Satellite Corp., 2002 SCC 78, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 205,
para. 71 (Can.); Muscutt v. Courcelles, (2002) 60 O.R. (3d) 20, para. 41 (Can.). Case law
seems to suggest that the prior assertion of jurisdiction by another court is an important
factor to consider in the forum non conveniens analysis. See, e.g., Molson Coors Brewing
Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., (2006) 83 O.R. 3d 331 (Can.); Westec Aerospace, Inc. v.
Raytheon Aircraft Co., 1999 BCCA 134, (1999) 67 B.C.L.R. 3d 278 (Can.); 472900 B.C.
Ltd. v. Thrifty Canada, Ltd., (1998) 168 D.L.R. 4th 602 (Can. B.C.C.A.).
196
For the series of decisions in Ontario and Saskatchewan, see Merck Frosst Can. Ltd.
v. Wuttunee, 2009 SKCA 43 (Can.) (leave to appeal and leave to cross-appeal to S.C.C.
dismissed.); Merck Frosst Can. Ltd. v. Wuttunee, 2009 SKCA 43 (Can.) (certification of
Saskatchewan action overturned on class definition issues); Wuttunee v. Merck Frosst Can.
Ltd., 2008 SKQB 229 (Can.) (Saskatchewan class action converted to a multijurisdictional
class action include extra-provincial classes, following changes to the Saskatchewan
legislation); Wuttunee v. Merck Frosst Can. Ltd., 2008 SKQB 78 (Can.) (certification of
Saskatchewan class action); Tiboni v. Merck Frosst Can. Ltd., (2008) 295 D.L.R. 4th 32
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (certification of Ontario multijurisdictional class action); Setterington
v. Merck Frosst Can. Ltd., [2006] O.J. No. 376 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (Ontario carriage
motion).
197
Mignacacca v. Merck Forst Can. Ltd., (2009) 95 O.R. 3d 269, para. 86 (Can.).
198
Merck Frosst Can. Ltd. v. Wuttunee, 2009 SKCA 43 (Can.). Note that the decision to
decertify the class was not related to the Ontario court’s decision to retain jurisdiction over
the parallel multi-jurisdictional class.
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Both Justice van Rensburg and Justice Corbett referred to the parallel
multi-jurisdictional class proceedings that had been certified in the Vioxx
litigation to support the view that the potential existence of overlapping
multi-jurisdictional classes is “not an obstacle” to the certification of a
global class in Ontario.199 The Vioxx case—rather than signaling that
parallel proceedings are acceptable—should sound a cautionary note about
the certification of overlapping classes. Commentators have repeatedly
pointed to the Vioxx litigation as illustrative of the problems associated with
a lack of coherent framework for resolving clashes between multijurisdictional class actions.200 A substantial body of literature has
developed to address how to coordinate multiple multi-jurisdictional class
proceedings within Canada.201 Moreover, the Canadian Bar Association has
recently released the Canadian Judicial Protocol for the Management of
Multijurisdictional Class Actions, which addresses how to use “existing
class action legislation and the Rules of Court/Rules of Civil Procedure in
various provincial jurisdictions to facilitate the management of
multijurisdictional class actions.”202 The objective here is not to canvass
the various possibilities for coordinating multi-jurisdictional class
proceedings in Canada, but rather to illustrate just how difficult it has been
to resolve the problems associated with the certification of parallel class
actions within Canada.
Since Canadian courts as-of-yet have been unable to resolve clashes

199
See Silver v. Imax Corp., 2009) 86 C.P.C. 6th 273, para. 133 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)
(Certification Decision).
200
See Walker, Recognizing Multijurisdiction, supra note 82, at 465–69; see also Can.
Bar Ass’n, Canadian Judicial Protocol for the Management of Multijurisdictional Class
Actions, 2011 CAN. BAR ASS’N 4 (“The need for a workable mechanism to deal with parallel
and competing multijurisdictional class actions was underlined by events surrounding
Vioxx”).
201
See, e.g., Ward K. Branch & Christopher Rhone, Solving the National Class Problem,
4TH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM ON CLASS ACTIONS (2007) (addressing the National Class Action
Database); Chris Dafoe, A Path Through the Class Action Chaos: Selecting the Most
Appropriate Jurisdiction with a National Class Action Panel, 3 CAN. CLASS ACTION REV.
541 (2003) (exploring the possibility of adopting a body similar to the U.S. Federal Court’s
Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation in Canada); Fiona Hickman, National Competing
Class Proceedings: Carriage Motions, Anti-Suit Injunction, Judicial Co-operation and
Other Options, 1 CAN. CLASS ACTION REV. 367, 399 (2004) (concluding that the following
policies are most likely to address the national competing class proceedings problem in
Canada: “counsel collaboration when possible; national carriage declarations; and judicial
cooperation”); Saumier, supra note 106, at 481 (suggesting that a lis pendens rule may
present “the key element for competing class actions in Canada”); Janet Walker,
Coordinating Multijurisdiction Class Actions Through Existing Certification Processes, 42
CAN. BUS. L. J. 112 (2005) (discussing the coordination of multiple multijurisdictional class
actions); Walker, Recognizing Multijurisdiction, supra note 82 (suggesting the creation of
the Canadian equivalent to the U.S. Multi-District Litigation Panel).
202
Can. Bar Ass’n, supra note 200, at pmbl. 11.
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between inter-provincial class actions, it is surprising that they would
purport to assume jurisdiction over foreign class members, thereby creating
an international class conflict.203 Had the Imax court conducted a proper
forum non conveniens analysis—one that appropriately accounted for the
issues of multiplicity—it would have undoubtedly come to the conclusion
that it should not have assumed jurisdiction over the claims of foreign class
plaintiffs.
As a matter of logic, it would appear the courts of a foreign country are
better suited to hearing a case involving foreign claimants who purchased or
sold securities on a foreign exchange.204 The parties and witnesses will be
located in foreign country; the defendant will be subject to the jurisdiction
of the foreign court (because it listed its securities on a foreign stock
market); and the law to be applied will be foreign securities law. Even
ignoring specific concerns about multiplicity of proceedings, a foreign
forum is clearly more appropriate than a Canadian one to adjudicate claims
of this nature.
When concerns unique to parallel proceedings are grafted onto the
forum non conveniens inquiry, it becomes even more apparent that
Canadian courts should not be asserting jurisdiction over global class
actions in these circumstances. Parallel class proceedings are seen as
problematic because they create the potential for inconsistent judgments
and result in a waste of both litigant and judicial resources. One author
asserts:
Duplicative litigation is patently wasteful. It imposes a heavy
financial burden on the parties by forcing them to litigate the same
case simultaneously in two places, and sometimes in piecemeal
fashion. It also needlessly consumes scarce court resources, as two
judges work on the same legal problem. The waste is magnified if
the ultimate judgment in one action renders the other action
meaningless.205

If a U.S. and a Canadian court were to render inconsistent judgments
203
This international class conflict is further evidenced by the recent settlement of Imax
claims in the U.S. litigation. Dimitri Lascaris, counsel for the class members in the
Canadian litigation, argued that the U.S. settlement requires a sign-off by a Canadian court
and that “[n]obody . . . has any business settling claims of our class members without our
court’s approval.” Michael D. Goldhaber, The Global Lawyer: Global Class Actions After
Morrison, THE AM. L. DAILY (Feb. 10, 2012, 4:03 PM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/
amlawdaily/2012/02/the-global-lawyer-global-class-actions-after-morrison.html. Goldhaber
notes that the Imax case illustrates the potential for “jurisdictional friction.” Id.
204
This is particularly so where the foreign forum has a robust institutional and
regulatory framework to properly address the securities fraud.
205
Austen Parrish, Duplicative Foreign Litigation, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 237, 244–45
(2010).
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in respect of the claims of U.S. plaintiffs in Imax, it would be doubtful that
a U.S. court would recognize a Canadian judgment over a U.S. one. If this
is the case, why include those foreign claimants in the Canadian class action
in the first place? This only complicates the class action and squanders
judicial resources in Canada.
Perhaps most importantly, comity concerns dictate that Canadian
courts exhibit restraint in certifying global class actions containing foreign
claimants, particularly where the interests of such claimants are already
being accommodated in foreign proceedings. In Canadian forum non
conveniens jurisprudence (including class jurisprudence), the notion of
comity is paramount.206 At its basic level, comity connotes the idea that
courts in one country owe due respect and deference for the courts of
another.207 Austen Parrish describes the role of comity in parallel
proceedings as follows:
Continuing a case, when the same case between the same parties was
already filed in a foreign forum, can implicate foreign relations and
breed resentment. As one scholar notes, “[n]ot only are foreign
relations apt to be more fragile than” state-to-state and federal-tostate relations, “but they are also more apt to be disturbed—
specifically by the apparent interference of one state’s courts in the
judicial business of another’s.” In high-profile suits, duplicative
litigation can potentially interfere with the executive’s management
of foreign affairs. And when duplicative litigation proceeds
simultaneously in two countries, courts are aware of the key role
they play. “One court may be asked to accelerate (or delay) its
adjudication to thwart (or enhance) the potentially preclusive effect
of a result in the other court, a strategy that squarely pits docket
against docket, if not court against court.”208

By proceeding with domestic litigation in the face of identical (or
nearly identical) litigation elsewhere, courts in one country risk offending
those in another by implying that the latter are not as well-equipped to
206

See, e.g., Ingenium Technologies Corp. v. McGraw-Hill Co., 2005, BCCA 358,
[2005] 255 D.L.R. 4th 499, para. 26 (Can. B.C.C.A.) (comity required that B.C. action be
stayed in favor of action proceeding in New York; court indicated that to allow action to
proceed in B.C. “would raise the real potential for conflicting decisions in the resolution of
the dispute and markedly increase the cost of the litigation, all to no avail.”).
207
See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895) (“‘Comity,’ in the legal sense, is
neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or other persons
who are under the protection of its laws.”).
208
Parrish, supra note 205, at 246–47 (citations omitted).
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adjudicate the case. Although Canadian courts have customarily been
sensitive to comity concerns, the Imax case appears to be an outlier.
When the dispute at issue is one which, while private, also implicates
broader regulatory policy, comity concerns become even more pressing. A
Canadian court’s assertion of jurisdiction in a case such as Imax may
interfere with the U.S.’s ability to regulate securities fraud in the manner of
its choosing. Silberman argues, for instance, that although a single class
action in Canada initially seems “more attractive than fragmentation of the
litigation” it may be that “multiple actions … best approximate the
appropriate allocation of enforcement authority.”209 She suggests that
“[d]ifferent standards of liability and different methods of private
enforcement apply under these different regimes, and it may be sensible to
recognize these differences.” 210 The U.S. Supreme Court expressed a
similar sentiment in Morrison:
Like the United States, foreign countries regulate their domestic
securities exchanges and securities transactions occurring within
their territorial jurisdiction. And the regulation of other countries
often differs from ours as to what constitutes fraud, what disclosures
must be made, what damages are recoverable, what discovery is
available in litigation, what individual actions may be joined in a
single suit, what attorney’s fees are recoverable, and many other
matters. [Various countries] have filed amicus briefs in this case . . .
They all complain of the interference with foreign securities
regulation that application of §10(b) abroad would produce[.]211

The reasoning in Morrison suggests that Canadian courts should be
wary of adjudicating the claims of foreign plaintiffs where to do so would
interfere with interests of foreign nations in the regulation of their securities
markets.
The court in Imax failed to account for the existence of foreign parallel
class proceedings in its decision to certify a global class action. Any
consideration of the issue would entail analyzing the underlying factual
connection of the dispute with a foreign jurisdiction, the possibility for
inconsistent results, the potential that a Canadian judgment would not be
recognized abroad, inefficiencies associated with multiple proceedings and
the role of comity. Had these factors been considered by the Imax court, it
would have undoubtedly come to the conclusion that Ontario was not the
most appropriate forum for the resolution of the claims of foreign
shareholders.

209
210
211

Silberman, supra note 1, at 16.
Id.
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885–86.
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E. Notice and Procedural Rights
An analysis of global class actions would be incomplete without a
discussion of the notice issues presented by the certification of a class
action containing foreign claimants. Under an opt-out regime, absent
claimants are apprised of the class action proceedings and their right to optout through the provision of notice to the class. Class action notices
generally describe the proceedings and fee agreements, indicate that a
judgment will be binding on all class members, and state the manner by
which claimants may opt out of the proceeding.212 Since absent class
members are not actively involved in the class action proceeding, the notice
preserves their litigation autonomy by providing them with a practical
means to “exit” from the class.213
Notice is bound up with the conflict of laws issues at the core of global
class actions. In Currie, Justice Shape suggested that notice and the right to
opt out were relevant to the question of jurisdiction simpliciter over foreign
class members. In particular, he observed that “before concluding that
Ontario law should recognize the jurisdiction of the Illinois court . . . we
should be satisfied that the procedures adopted in the [Illinois] action were
sufficiently attentive to the rights and interests of the unnamed non-resident
class members.” 214 He concluded that “respect for procedural rights,
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See, e.g., Province of Ontario Class Proceedings Act, R.S.O. 1992, c. 6, S.17 (Can.).
On the notion of “exit” from class actions, see, e.g., John Coffee Jr., Class Action
Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000); see also Canada Post v. Lépine, 2009 SCC 16, [2009] 1 S.C.R.
549, para. 42 (Can.) (“[A]dequate information is necessary to satisfy the requirement that
individual rights be safeguarded in a class proceeding. The notice procedure is indispensible
in that it informs class members about how the judgment authorizing the class action or
certifying the class proceedings affects them, about the rights – in particular, the possibility
of opting out of the class action – they have under the judgment.”).
214
Currie v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Can. Ltd., [2005] 250 D.L.R. 4th 224, para. 25
(Can.); see also id. at para. 30 (“In my view, provided (a) there is a real and substantial
connection linking the cause of action to the foreign jurisdiction, (b) the rights of nonresident class members are adequately represented, and (c) non-resident class members are
accorded procedural fairness including adequate notice, it may be appropriate to attach
jurisdictional consequences to an unnamed plaintiff’s failure to opt out.”). For academic
commentary on this aspect of the Currie case, see Saumier, supra note 106, at 19 (“Currie
must stand for the view that the adequacy of notice in class actions goes to jurisdiction by
way of the fairness principle under Morguard.”); Ellen Snow, Protecting Canadian Plaintiffs
in International Class Actions: The Need for a Principled Approach in Light of Currie v.
McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada Ltd., 2 CAN. CLASS ACTION REV. 217, 238 (2005) (“The
Currie decision in turn imports these procedural rights into applying the real and substantial
connection test and thus changes the law in this area. Post-Currie it appears that the real and
substantial connection test has a new dimension to it; the test is no longer limited to
assessing whether there is a sufficient nexus between the forum and the action, but will now
also assess the fairness of the proceedings to determine whether or not the assumption of
jurisdiction is justified.”).
213
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including the adequacy of representation, the adequacy of notice and the
right to opt out, could fortify the connection with Illinois jurisdiction and
alleviate concerns regarding unfairness.”215 It is unclear whether notice and
the right to opt-out are appropriately part of the jurisdiction simpliciter
analysis.216 What is clear, however, is that these procedural safeguards are
relevant to the recognition/enforcement of a class judgment. Canadian
courts will refuse to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment, including a
class judgment, when it was rendered contrary to principles of natural
justice.217 In Currie, the Ontario Court declined to recognize the U.S. class
judgment on the basis that it failed to satisfy minimum Canadian standards
of natural justice. The court concluded that “the wording of the notice was
so technical and obscure that the ordinary class member would have
difficulty understanding the implications of the proposed settlement on their
legal rights in Canada or that they had the right to opt out.”218 Thus,
notwithstanding whether notice goes to the issue of jurisdiction or to the
defense of natural justice (or both), it remains a critical conflict of laws
concern associated with global class actions.
The court in Imax was attuned to the notice issues presented by the
existence of foreign class members, and in fact rejected the litigation plan
proposed by the plaintiff because it “fail[ed] to address issues specific to a
global class.”219 In particular, the plan did not identify the steps that needed
to be taken to address the interests of non-resident class members and
lacked detail with respect to the form, substance and distribution of notice
to non-resident class members.220 The court thus made global class
certification contingent upon the plaintiffs’ submission of an acceptable
amended litigation plan.221
Providing adequate notice to foreign class members complicates
already-complex class action litigation. The parties will need to identify the
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Currie v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Can. Ltd., [2005] 250 D.L.R. 4th 224, para. 25
(Can.).
216
See, e.g., Snow, supra note 214, at 242 (“[T]he better and more principled approach to
protecting plaintiffs comes from distinguishing between questions of jurisdiction and the
defense of natural justice.”).
217
CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 164, at §14.8 (“A foreign judgment can be impeached
if the proceedings in which the judgment was obtained were contrary to natural justice. The
failure to provide adequate notice of the proceeding and sufficient opportunity to be heard
are primary breaches of natural justice . . .”).
218
Currie v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Can. Ltd., [2005] 250 D.L.R. 4th 224, para. 39
(Can.). The Court of Appeal in Currie was also concerned about the reach of the class
action notice—and, in particular, that notice reached more class members in the United
States than it did in Canada.
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Silver v. Imax Corp., (2009) 86 C.P.C. 6th 273, para. 229 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)
(Certification Decision).
220
Id.
221
Id. at para. 231.
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location of foreign class members, craft a special notice to address foreign
class members’ interests, identify the means of disseminating the class
action notice abroad, potentially set up a foreign claims administration
process, etc. Getting notice “noticed” in a foreign country can be a
challenging undertaking.
When parallel (foreign and Canadian) class proceedings are underway,
there is additional difficulty in providing notice. Putative class members
who are included in both classes may receive two separate and
contradictory notices. Such was the case in Lépine, where class members in
Québec received one notice indicating that they were part of an Ontario
class settlement and another indicating that they were a member of a
Québec class action. In refusing to enforce the Ontario class settlement
against Québec class members, the Supreme Court observed that notice was
“particularly important” in a case were parallel proceedings were
underway.222 Given that the Ontario notice “made it look like the Ontario
proceeding was the only one,” absent class members in Québec could not
meaningfully understand their rights.223 As much as the existence of
parallel class proceedings is a concern for notice inter-provincially, it is
even more so internationally. Should Canadian courts take into account
parallel foreign proceedings in crafting class action notices for foreign class
members? If so, how exactly can Canadian courts apprise foreign class
members through notice that they are part of two different class actions—
one Canadian, one in their home countries—in a way that the class
members can meaningfully understand? Even if the Canadian notice could
be carefully tailored to explain the existence of parallel proceedings and
their implications, would that fact in itself constitute grounds for a foreign
court to find the Canadian notice confusing and thereby refuse to recognize
a Canadian class judgment?224 These issues were very recently litigated in
the Imax case. The plaintiffs maintained that the Canadian notice should
not make reference to the U.S. proceedings as any such reference would be
“confusing and unnecessary and would not assist class members in making
an informed decision.”225 The defendants and the lead plaintiff in the U.S.
222

Canada Post v. Lépine, 2009 SCC 16, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 549, para. 45 (Can.).
Id.
224
The Notice Protocol: Coordinating Notice(s) to the Class(es) in Multijurisdictional
Class Proceedings, which has been adopted by the ABA Litigation Section Council,
suggests that notice should include “a description of any other class action of which counsel
or their client(s) are aware involving or arising out of (in whole or in part) the same claims or
events as in the case before the Court and in which an alleged or certified class’s
membership includes some or all of the members of the class in the case that is the subject of
the notice.” Notice Protocol: Coordinating Notice(s) to the Class(es) in Multijurisdictional
Class Proceedings, 2011 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. § 5(b), available at http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/am/1106_aball_int_crossborder_class_action_coordin
ation.authcheckdam.pdf.
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Silver v. Imax, 2012 ONSC 1047, para. 47.
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proceeding argued the opposite—that the notice should provide the
plaintiffs with key information they would need to make an informed optout decision. As such, “[u]nless a ‘fully descriptive’ notice is provided,
there remains a significant risk that a U.S. court would not give full faith
and credit to a judgment or settlement . . . in relation to NASDAQ
purchasers who had not opted out.”226 After considering various sources
of authority, including the testimony of two U.S. experts, Justice van
Rensburg held that a fulsome description of the U.S. proceedings in the
Canadian notice was premature. In this respect, she stated:
At this stage the overlapping class members have not received any
notice in the U.S. Proceedings, although they may be aware of the
existence of such proceedings. Because there is another class
proceeding pending, which may in the future affect overlapping class
members’ interests, and in which they may receive notices, the
notice issued in these proceedings should inform class of the
existence of the U.S. Proceedings. In order to ensure that there is no
confusion, they should be specifically advised that it is unnecessary
for a class member to opt out of the Ontario proceedings in order to
participate in the U.S. Proceedings.
The notice should direct class members to a source of information
about the other proceedings, but it should not attempt to summarize
the status or evaluate the merits of the U.S. Proceedings. Any notice
that purported to contain detailed information about the U.S.
Proceedings or that compared the two proceedings would be
confusing. Even experienced counsel would find it impossible to
predict the forum in which the NASDAQ purchasers would likely be
more successful. In any event, such information is entirely
unnecessary and would not assist overlap class members in making
the only decision they need to make at this time – whether to opt out
or remain members of both classes.227

As the latest decision in the Imax saga plainly illustrates, notifying a
class of foreign claimants that it is part of a Canadian class action,
particularly when there are parallel proceedings ongoing in the foreign
claimants’ home country, raises some difficult issues.
A related issue worth considering is the limits on the effectiveness of
notice for foreign class members who reside outside of the United States.228
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Id. at para. 48.
Id. at para. 96–97 (Justice van Rensberg’s forty-two-page judgment telegraphs the turf
wars that are the likely result of certifying overlapping class actions).
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On the ineffectiveness of notice generally in the United States, see Shannon R.
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While the court in Imax case certified a “global” class, the reality is that the
overwhelming majority of the foreign class members were American.
Given that most Americans speak English and at least have a passing
familiarity with the concept of a “class action,”229 the idea of crafting notice
for American claimants is not so difficult to imagine. However, it becomes
considerably more complex to design a notice to be sent to absent class
members in a foreign country who do not speak English and have never
even heard the term “class action.”230 One American commentator
describes the issue as follows:
Language issues can arise when a non-English speaker receives a
class action notice printed in English. Language issues can also arise
even when the class action notice is printed in the foreign claimant’s
native language. “As anyone who has ever tried to translate a
document from a foreign language knows, a literal word-by-word, or
even sentence-by-sentence, translation of a foreign document will at
best confuse . . . and at worst produce nonsense.”
Unfamiliarity with the legal system generally, and with class actions
in particular, can also interfere with the foreign claimant’s
comprehension of the class action notice. Class actions exist in few
jurisdictions outside the United States, so the class action concept
may be unknown to the foreign claimant. Thus, potential language
Wheatman & Terri R. LeClercq, Majority of Class Action Publication Notices Fail to Satisfy
Rule 23 Requirements, 30 REV. OF LITIG. 53 (2011).
229
Anecdotally, the author surmises that most people’s familiarity with class actions
comes from the 2000 blockbuster film, Erin Brockovich.
230
Very few countries outside the United States have anything akin to a U.S.-style class
action. See Deborah R. Hensler, The Globalization of Class Actions: An Overview, 622
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 7, 16 (2009) (“Because the United States has been the
leading model for class action adoption in recent years, its choices with regard to these
different class action procedure design features—standing for private actors to represent a
class, trans-substantive application of the procedure, availability of money damages, and an
opt-out rather than an opt-in procedure for money damage class actions—constitute what has
come to be known as a ‘U.S.-style class action.’ Of the eighteen countries that reported
some form of class action procedure, only six in addition to the United States have such a
class action regime: Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Israel, Portugal, and Norway.”). In fact,
many foreign countries are deliberately taking steps to fashion collective redress procedures
that do not mimic those in the United States. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 141, at
180 (“And, yet, one need spend only a few minutes in conversations with European
reformers before the proverbial ‘but’ enters the discourse: ‘But, of course, we shall not have
American-style class actions.’ At this point, all participants nod sagely, confident that
collective actions, representative actions, group actions, and a host of other aggregative
arrangements can bring all the benefits of fair and efficient resolution to disputes without the
dreaded world of American entrepreneurial lawyering. And no doubt the American
entrepreneurial ways must and will be resisted fully, in much the same way that Europe has
held off the unwelcome presence of McDonald’s or Starbucks in its elegant piazzas.”).
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issues, unfamiliarity with the U.S. legal system, and the natural
human tendency to ignore that which we do not understand, all
combine to render notice potentially ineffectual for foreign
claimants.231

Clearly, if Canadian courts continue to entertain the prospect of global
class actions, the time will come where legal, cultural, and linguistic
considerations will factor into the notice equation.
Finally, in order for a Canadian class judgment to bind foreign
plaintiffs, such claimants must be adequately represented.232
This
encompasses both adequate representation by a named class plaintiff as well
as adequate representation by class counsel. Due regard for the procedural
rights of foreign absent claimants may dictate the creation of foreign
subclasses and/or the appointment of foreign class counsel to ensure that the
foreign class members’ interests are adequately protected.233 If Canadian
courts continue certifying global classes, they will need to determine what
the threshold is for “adequate representation” of foreign class plaintiffs,
bearing in mind that the standards may be different in the foreign forum.
While the creation of foreign subclasses or the appointment of foreign class
counsel is clearly not an insurmountable hurdle,234 it is yet another issue
that puts in a wrinkle in the global certification decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
Are courts in Canada “setting themselves up to be the Shangri-La’s of
global class action securities litigation”?235 Perhaps not quite yet. While
the Imax decision has opened the door to global securities litigation in
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Bassett, supra note 133, at 65–66; see also Buschkin, supra note 144, at 1582–83
(“When many of the potential class members live outside of the United States, determining
what constitutes adequate notice is more complicated. Linguistic and cultural barriers make
it more difficult to ‘communicate effectively to [foreign] claimants their rights and options.’
If the judge is not familiar with the language, customs, literacy levels, or print-media sources
of the foreign countries in which the potential class members reside, it is virtually impossible
to draft an order identifying the ‘best notice practicable under the circumstances.’ If the
foreign class members do not receive adequate notice, they cannot be bound to the class
settlement or final judgment, because binding them without proper notice would violate their
due process rights.”).
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Adequate representation at all times is a jurisdictional predicate in the United States.
See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985).
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For an American perspective on the ethical issues involved in multi-jurisdictional
class litigation practice, see Rex R. Perschbacher, Lawyers and Ethical
Issues/Considerations In Cross-Border Class Action Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 735,
736 (2004).
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See Bassett, supra note 133, at 85 (noting that “subclasses increase class litigation
complexity and may invoke potential manageability issues”).
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Silberman, supra note 1, at 17.
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Canada, it is not clear how long that door will remain open.
The certification of global classes in Canada raises a myriad of conflict
of laws complications. First, there are unsettled questions regarding the
circumstances under which a Canadian court can assume jurisdiction over
foreign class members: is the real and substantial connection test, developed
to govern the question of jurisdiction over ex juris defendants, the
appropriate test to govern the unique issue of personal jurisdiction over
foreign claimants? If so, how is the real and substantial connection test to
be applied in this context? Is the “commonality of interest” approach that
has found favor in some courts applicable to foreign (as opposed to nonresident) claimants? Second, the certification of global classes in Canada
raises issues related to the recognition of an eventual class judgment: What
role should the eventual preclusive effect of a Canadian class judgment play
in the certification calculus? If a foreign court would refuse to grant res
judicata effect to a Canadian judgment containing foreign claimants, why
include those claimants in the class definition to begin with? Is an opt-in
regime for foreign claimants a viable solution to the res judicata problem?
Third, global classes in Canada raise intricate choice of law problems: What
law governs the statutory claims of claimants who purchase and sell
securities on a foreign exchange? Would a Canadian court apply foreign
securities laws in a domestic proceeding, or would the foreign public law
exception bar the application of foreign law in this context? What law
governs the common law claims of shareholders? How do all these choice
of law issues impact the certification of a global class action? Fourth, the
existence of foreign parallel proceedings adds another twist in the road:
How much weight should Canadian courts give overlapping foreign
proceedings when deciding whether to certify a global class? How should
concerns about multiplicity of proceedings and comity figure into the
certification or forum non conveniens decision? Finally, the certification of
global classes creates additional problems of notice and representation.
How do courts ensure that notice gets “noticed” in a foreign country? Are
there cultural or linguistic concerns that need to be accounted for? How do
Canadian courts craft adequate notice when foreign parallel proceedings are
underway? Do separate class representatives or class counsel need to be
appointed to represent the interests of foreign claimants?
The Imax court provided a disappointing answer to these questions. Its
solution to many of these conflict of laws concerns was simply to “wait and
see” how they developed and then to deal with the issues “as
appropriate.”236 The court failed to recognize, however, that the conflict of
laws considerations are fundamentally connected with the propriety of
certifying a global class. To certify a class without accounting for the
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conflict of laws issues is like spilling a glass of water, only to indicate that
it can be “un-spilled” later, if need be. The decision to certify a global class
action (as opposed to a national class, or not certifying a class at all) will
shape subsequent litigation strategy and settlement dynamics. So it is
important to get it right the first time.
To be sure, Imax signals that global classes have come to Canada. The
question is whether they are here to stay.
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